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The task of overseeing food security at an international scale is complicated 
by the multi-variable and complex nature of the problem. Nevertheless, much policy 
and governance work has been done through international, most of all through the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Within the FAO, the 
Committee for World Food Security (CFS) formalizes food security policy, 
guidelines, and assessments, acting as the main food security governance body 
within the much broader FAO. Previous research has pointed out the presence of a 
food security governance system but has not interrogated how power can be 
understood within this system. I use Foucault’s theory of biopolitics, along with 
critical discourse analysis and discursive institutionalism, to determine how the CFS 
enacts biopolitical governance through its discursive framework, and what tools the 
CFS uses to achieve this governance. I find that through both the CFS’ heavy 
emphasis on food production as a solution to food insecurity and the comprehensive 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of food security as policy appears at first to be basic: humans need 
food to survive, therefore any governing body should do what it can to see that 
people are getting fed. This common-sense approach to food security is what often 
appears in policy discussions and white papers about the linkages between hunger, 
poverty, and development. Whether it is labelled as “food security,” “food 
insecurity,” or “hunger,” the ideas that constitute food security as a policy object can 
be seen in development and aid initiatives from popular events such as the Live Aid 
concerts in 1985, which set out to raise money for the concurrent famine in 
Ethiopia, to formalized policy initiatives at sub-national, national, and international 
levels. In these formal settings, food security is often tied to poverty reduction 
mechanisms. Using Canada as an example, food security consultations and policy 
research took place under the Wynne premiership in Ontario, resulting in a white 
paper placing Ontario’s first attempt at a provincial food security strategy under the 
government’s larger Poverty Reduction Strategy (Government of Ontario, 2017). At 
the national level in Canada, mention of food security can be found in Health Canada 
statistical models on the relationship between community health, income level and 
food security (Statistics Canada, 2007), although formal discussions of food security 
at the federal level often fail to produce meaningful policy results precisely because 
of the connection made by legislators between food security and poverty (McIntyre 
et al., 2018). 
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At the international level, the connection between poverty reduction and 
food security is even more explicit. The United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) previous policy goals listed the 
eradiation of poverty and hunger together in the number one spot on the list, while 
the more recent iterations of these in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
places them in the top two policy priority spots (UNDP 2019).  The linkage between 
poverty, development and food security can be seen in the justification for the “Zero 
Hunger” goal of the SDGs, which discusses extreme hunger, malnutrition, 
undernutrition, and food insecurity as directly related to limited market access, 
economic growth, infrastructure investment and productivity (UNDP, 2019).  
This understanding of food security in relation to poverty and development 
is useful in a pragmatic sense for creating actionable and quantifiable goals, which is 
ultimately what the above examples seek. Moreover, the intersection of food 
security, development, and poverty, especially in the form of food aid programs that 
seek to solve multiple problems at once, has led to fruitful scholarship in both the 
social sciences and public health literature (Bassett, 2010; Drolet, 2012; Essex, 
2010; Leonhäuser, 2013; Margulis, 2012; McMichael and Schneider, 2011). Yet 
situating food security solely in development and poverty discourse, and only as a 
problem of delivering aid to the poorest, is just one way to understand how food 
security functions as a policy in international politics. 
Another way to understand food security as international policy is through 
the discourse of global governance, here termed as “food security governance”. The 
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distinction between food security governance and food aid is slight but important 
and is seen in the scope of the two concepts: food aid discourse is just one part of 
food security governance, which is broader in scope. While discussions about food 
aid look to the practical implications of food security policy, food security 
governance describes decision-making processes and resulting discourse within 
dynamic institutional and organizational structures, often, although not necessarily, 
at the international level of governance, and particularly within the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO). It is this concept that is the central focus of this 
thesis.  
While it is possible to give descriptors of food security governance as policy, 
it is difficult to pin down what specifically is meant by the concept. Some recent 
scholarship (Candel, 2014; Allen, 2013) argues that there is a lack of consensus on 
what exactly is meant by “food security governance,” and that this poses a major 
problem for the literature moving forward. Yet as Duncan and Claeys argue, this 
may be a feature of the concept, rather than a bug. They argue that food security is a 
highly dynamic concept that exists in ever-changing political and economic contexts, 
and that as a governance problem food security evades basic, neutral diagnosis and 
solutions (Duncan and Claeys, 2018). Candel also observes this theme of complexity 
and lack of clear solutions, arguing that food security governance is “characterized 
by a high degree of complexity,” and that governance itself is often used as “a 
challenge and a solution to food security” (2014: 586).  
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The complexity of food security as a subject of governance means that it is 
usually beyond the ability of individual states to deal with (Margulis, 2013). Yet, as 
Candel (2014) notes, the literature is clear that there is also no single, authoritative 
governance body dealt the responsibility of governing food security, and instead 
that responsibility is spread across multiple, and often overlapping, organizations 
and forums. Despite Candel’s analysis, there is consensus on the presence of an 
international or global food system, (Friedmann, 1982; Hopkins, 1992; Butcel and 
Goodman, 1989; Gustafon and Markie, 2009) which although marked by complexity, 
is centered around the main food governance institution, the FAO.  
The FAO is a Specialized Agency of the UN, which is a grouping of agencies 
tasked with technical and regulatory objectives. These agencies exist under the 
supervision of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which along with the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA), International Court of Justice (ICJ), UN Security 
Council (UNSC), Secretariat, and Trusteeship council, make up the principal organs 
of the UN body. The FAO’s primary objective is to ensure secure food for the world, 
often accomplished through policy recommendations, setting international food and 
nutrition standards, and promoting technological and economic mechanisms to 
assist with agricultural production (“About FAO,” 2019).  
Because of the complexity of food security governance, the unevenness of 
economic and political power, and the central discursive framework focused on the 
regulation of food, I examine the role of the FAO, and specifically the Committee of 
World Food Security (CFS) through a biopolitical lens. The work of Foucault and to a 
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lesser extent Agamben help illustrate the main questions of this thesis: how does the 
discursive framework of the CFS enact a system of biopolitical governance? And 
what biopolitical tools does the CFS use in order to regulate a central force of life, 
that is to say, food? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Three main themes in the existing literature help direct and situate this 
research. First, this thesis examines the literature on global governance. While 
broad, this discussion provides a solid foundation on which following sections will 
be built upon. This includes a look at what is meant by “global governance,” how it 
functions in practise through international soft laws, the evolution of governance 
norms, and what global governance means for international institutions and 
organizations like the FAO, especially with regards to ideas of legitimacy. This last 
point on legitimacy is particularly important to discuss since it plays a part in the 
next section on international organizations and their day-to-day functioning.  
 Since this research is heavily focused on the analysis of FAO food security 
discourse, it is important to contextualize the entire project within the literature on 
international institutions. This section looks primarily at the structural aspects of 
international institutions. To this end, it explores research done on internal and 
external forces of influence within international institutions, the functioning of 
specialized agencies, the role of soft laws within institutions like the FAO, and 
research on the functioning of the FAO.  
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 The third and final section of the literature review examines research on food 
security governance in theory and practise. The theoretical aspects of food security 
governance situate food security within the literature of global governance more 
broadly in order to understand how food security functions as an object of 
governance. This discussion then moves to a look at the literature on food security 
governance in practise, which focuses on the way that institutional and bureaucratic 
systems at the international level act on food security as a policy issue.  
THEORY AND METHOD 
 
 The theoretical and methodological section of this paper function to not only 
frame the research done on FAO discourse, but help to synthesize this research with 
the literature discussed in the previous section. To do this, this section discusses 
three theoretical frameworks that build off each other to fully contextualize the 
research done in the proceeding sections. Building off the last point discussed in the 
literature review, the first theoretical framework explored is Foucault’s biopolitics 
and its role in the global governance of food security. Using the works of Foucault 
and Agamben, and other theoretical works such as Roberts’ Biopolitics and Global 
Governance (2010), the aim of this discussion is to use biopolitics as a tool for 
understanding the FAO as an institution at the intersection of human security and 
global governance.  
Second, this chapter discusses the methodological frameworks of critical 
discourse analysis, which helps shape the discussion of the discursive functions of 
the CFS. This methodology is particularly important since the work that I analyze is 
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CFS Session reports, assessments and policy papers. Although this methodology 
could stand alone to provide a solid analytical framework, I include a third 
theoretical and methodological concept in order to provide depth of analysis and 
applicability to an international organizational setting, providing a discussion of 
discursive institutionalism, which is a more recent addition to the “new 
institutionalism” methodological school. Relying on the works of Schmidt (2010; 
2011), St. Clair (2006), and Weiler (2009), this discussion helps anchor the 
theoretical discussion in the institutional settings where actors form and deploy 
discursive framings and concepts.  
THE FAO AND THE CFS 
 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the story of the FAO and food security governance in 
the CFS, providing both a historical context for understanding food security 
governance at the international level, and also the subject of my analysis in Chapter 
5. The chapter begins with a brief history of the FAO, which focuses on the internal 
and external factors that shaped key policy decisions and organizational changes, 
including the post-war peace, the technocracy of the Cold War era, the 
transformative 1996 World Food Summit. This is followed by a short explanation of 
what role the FAO plays in the UN system, in order to provide the current larger 
organizational context for the FAO. Finally, this chapter looks at the CFS from 1976, 
when it was created, until the most recent session in 2019. This section is split into 
two parts to focus on two major areas of the CFS’ work. First, I look at the global 
food security assessments conducted by the Committee to understand how they 
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view food security. Second, I look at the policy decisions and guidelines 
recommended by the Committee to understand their responses to their 
assessments, and to see how they frame food security governance. 
BIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 In chapter 5, the groundwork set out in chapter 4 is analyzed through a 
biopolitical lens. I accomplish this by looking at two major themes that emerge in 
the Committee’s discourse on food security governance and assessments: 
production and statistics. These two themes, which are derived from the 
assessments and policy documents of the CFS show food security governance to be 
biopolitical in nature. Following Foucault, I argue that the failure of the CFS to 
regulate food security itself, instead focusing its institutional logic and power on 
producing and managing populations through statistical measurement and analysis, 
is precisely what makes it biopolitical in nature. I conclude by reflecting on and 















One of the primary themes of the existing literature on global governance is 
how international institutions operate, especially focusing on the normative and 
administrative function of those institution’s bureaucracies. Further, the discourse 
on global governance must be contended with, since it has permeated discussions of 
international relations, the politics of international institutions, and the study of 
world politics to such an extent that “global governance” has come to be a catch-all 
phrase for anything that might occur politically on a global scale. In order to provide 
focus and limit the universalizing aspects of the concept of global governance, this 
section is broken down into three parts. First, I look at the definition and debates on 
how to define global governance. Second, I discuss international law and global 
governance as a fundamentally regulatory force. Finally, I briefly look at the 
literature on global governmentality as a bridge to connect the literature on global 
governance to the theoretical lens of biopolitics and governmentality applied below. 
“WHAT IS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE?” – DEBATES ON MEANING 
 
Defining global governance as a concept faces two challenges: first, the 
concept itself is contested, and second, there is a debate within the literature on 
where to start methodologically in defining the global governance. (Ba and Hoffman, 
2005; Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; Hofferberth, 2015; Overbeek et al., 2010). 
Hofferberth argues that because “global governance” is used to signify a multiplicity 
of larger ideas in international relations, it is best to understand global governance 
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as a “slippery concept” which fundamentally lacks specificity (2015: 598-617). This 
ambiguity provides conceptual strength for Hofferberth, since it allows for a flexible 
framework through which global politics can be best understood and analyzed 
(2015: 602). This position offers a view into the complexity of the concept itself but 
does not provide a way forward in the meta-debate. Instead, Hofferberth’s argument 
can be understood to be part of a larger debate over whether global governance is 
primarily an analytical concept or a normative concept. Dingwerth and Pattberg 
(2006: 189, 195) frame the governance debate in this way, contending that the 
normative view of global governance considers the concept as a highly political 
framework through which to view international political interactions, characterized 
by a “discursive struggle over who decides what for whom,” while an analytical view 
of global governance considers the concept as a way to process “observable 
phenomenon” such as the mechanisms underpinning systems of rule, the “plethora 
of forms of social organization”. Put simply, the normative view of global 
governance sees it as ambiguous and value-laden but not referring to any particular 
phenomenon, while the analytical view of global governance is equated with already 
existing phenomenon and the material conditions of world politics. 
Hofferberth’s conceptualization of global governance as a “slippery concept” 
and ambiguous framework can be seen as an argument for a normative 
understanding of global governance. On the other hand, Dodds argues that global 
governance is a purely analytical concept because it generally refers to collective 
political action, dealing with norms and values as well as laws, that exceeds the 
management capabilities of any one state (2016, 98). Similarly, Overbeek et al. argue 
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for an analytical reading of global governance, since in their view global governance 
fundamentally functions as a regulatory and institutional ensemble “to manage the 
conditions for the global mobility and accumulation of capital” (2010: 699). For the 
authors, global governance necessarily suggests that there is something concrete to 
govern, and that this governance has a distinct and unambiguous socio-political and 
class-based character (Overbeek et al. 2010, 699, 708). For Brachthaüser, the 
process of making sense of global governance is the process of ordering these socio-
political structures and the “complex relationships and multi-level interactions” 
between them (2011: 222).  
In their review of the literature on global governance, Ba and Hoffmann 
(2005) created a loose taxonomy of phenomena that scholars signify when they 
write about global governance. They found that these phenomena include 
international regimes, international society, hegemonic stability, dynamics of 
globalization, the pursuit of an international organization’s (IO) goals, global change, 
transformation in the global political economy, world government, and global civil 
society. Biermann et al. cluster together these often-interconnected phenomena into 
what they call the “architectures” of global governance, which encapsulate the 
complex relationships between the regimes, norms, and institutions that make up 
global governance (2000: 15). Wilkinson and Hughes, cited in Grugel and Piper, 
argue along the same lines, stating that global governance is simply “the various 
patterns in which global, regional, national, and local actors combine to govern 
particular areas” (Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002: 2; Grugel and Piper, 2007: 7). 
Brachthaüser argues that these phenomena point to “complex processes of social 
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pattern formation” that are characterized by self-organization, management, and 
regulation (2011: 222). Of these three characteristics, it is regulation that is often 
the primary site of global governance, as Carin et al. note that global governance is 
“always part of multilayered regulation” (2006; 3).  
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AS REGULATORY  
 
The regulatory aspect of global governance comes in to play as governance 
challenges deepen in complexity, as Cadham and Manicom argue (2013: 242). That is, 
global governance efforts result in the “cross-cutting proliferation of discrete policy 
responses” in a multilayered and complex governance environment (Cadham and 
Manicom, 2013: 242). These policy responses are often created through quasi-
legislative mechanisms so that governance can be legitimized as soft international 
law, or in other words, as regulatory (Abbott and Snidal, 2000: 241). Here soft 
international law refers to legal mechanisms with little to no binding power, as 
opposed to hard laws, which impose binding rights and responsibilities. International 
law provides a common framework through which the regulatory aspect of global 
governance can be enacted (Diehl et al., 2003: 43). I provide a brief discussion of the 
literature on international law and global governance to understand not only the 
discussion of the regulatory aspects of global governance, but also the creation of 
norms within international institutions and the politics of knowledge production, 
which I discuss in more detail below.  
The common framework of international law provides a space for the 
interactive production of global governance of multi-scalar actors mentioned above 
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(Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002: 2; Grugel and Piper, 2007: 7). Brunée and Toope argue 
that law and legal norms, when used to justify the processes and “broad substantive 
ends” of global governance, allows for the creation of “shared rhetorical knowledge” 
(2000: 206). For Sands and Klein, the creation, elaboration, and negotiation of this 
shared rhetorical knowledge is a fundamental characteristic of international 
institutions, who are tasked with acting out global governance formally (2009: 267). 
Since these institutions are not able to make laws in a traditional sense (that is, with 
any direct legal consequences for those involved or sovereign legitimacy), the legal 
characteristic of global governance is purely symbolic (Sands and Klein, 2009: 268). 
Although this symbolic form of law-making was intended by the founders of 
international institutions (Sands and Klein 2009: 291), there is some recognition in 
the literature that the regulatory character of global governance and international 
law has become much more central to the overall global governance project (Cogan, 
2011; De Silva, 2017; Kourula et al., 2019).  
For Cogan, this framework over the past two decades has taken the shape of 
what he calls a “regulatory turn” in international law, where international institutions 
and actors dictate precise provisions required to be adopted at national and 
subnational levels (2011: 322). Most importantly, Cogan notes that the regulatory 
turn has seen international institutions dealing with specific individuals, rather than 
with national and regional governments (2011: 322). This has affected several areas 
of international law, such as international criminal and facilitative law, which are of 
particular interest to Cogan. He argues that the second half of the twentieth century, 
and especially the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union saw an increase 
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in the usage of sanctions on individuals and calls for the creation of international 
criminal tribunals to deal with individuals (Cogan, 2011: 348). There has also been 
an impact to the way global governance is enacted through international law in what 
Cogan calls “mediated laws,” by which he refers to treaty law and conventions (2011: 
349). He claims that while this area of international law is highly varied, there is a 
general trend towards state obligations within treaties and conventions becoming 
highly detailed, where previously there was discretionary space allowed for states to 
work out elaboration, enactment, and enforcement at the national level (Cogan, 2011: 
351). 
The regulatory turn in international law as part of the overall managerial 
character of global governance makes up what Roberts understands to be the 
mainstream view of global governance found within traditional international 
relations scholarship (2010: 27, 46). He argues that this view sees global governance 
as “functional and necessary to manage the unevenness of tumultuous globalization” 
or as the “governance without government” understanding of global governance 
(Roberts, 2010: 27-28). Yet this traditional perspective, as shown by Roberts, does 
not bother to ask who or what is doing the managing or regulating or how knowledge 
and power function within this global regulatory system beyond the narrow realist 
reading of power (Roberts, 2010: 46). Roberts notes that for realists, power in global 
governance takes the form of “manic outburst” rather than a chronic presence, or 
something inherent to the concept. This narrow reading of power is exemplified in 
Barnett and Duvall, who argue that power is simply the phenomenon of one state 
using its material resources to “compel another state to do something it does not want 
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to do” (2006: 40) For Roberts, these questions are unanswered by global governance 
scholarship simply because of the “primary perception of its subject matter in terms 
of technocratic ‘solutions’ to institutional problems” (2010: 165). This points to the 
growth in critical literature on global governance and the resulting concept of global 
governmentality. 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY  
 
 Building off of scholarship on the regulatory aspects of global governance, 
Halabi argues that global governance as a primarily regulatory phenomenon points 
to a system of power between developed and developing countries (2004: 21) That 
is, developed countries seek the expansion of global regulatory regimes to “regulate 
the behaviour” of developing states, while the acceptance of global governance and 
its regulations “marks the acceptance of regulations at the global level out of a 
conviction that such regulation will enable actors to seek wealth in an orderly 
fashion” (Halabi, 2004: 21). While this acceptance appears to imply an even playing 
field, the control and regulatory aspects of global governance remain well within the 
domain of developed countries who use it push for political and economic 
convergence, with countries who do not comply punished, or at the very least 
refused any benefits (Halabi, 2004: 33). The regulatory character of global 
governance is therefore tied to the necessities of global capital accumulation. Brand 
and Görg argue that the reproduction of global capitalist society can be regarded as 
missing a “steering centre,” or a centralized force of consistency and durability, 
necessitating governmental institutions. At a global scale, these institutions take the 
shape of global regulatory bodies such as the UN and its various branches (Brand 
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and Görg 2008: 573). This is compounded by national-scale market deregulation 
and privatization, increasing nation-state dependence on global capital, and 
therefore global regulatory systems (Brand and Görg, 2008: 574).  
This phenomenon makes up what Roberts, citing Cox, calls “global 
governance as hegemony” (2010: 32). For Roberts, hegemony constructs and 
projects “the potential for wealth and security” and the hegemonic power itself 
exerts that power “through the manipulation of knowledge and the production of 
legitimacy, subjective normality, and ‘common sense’” (2010: 32-33). Burnham 
argues, in a synthesis of the points raised above and the ideas of neo-Gramscians 
such as Cox and Gill, that an international hegemonic order emerges with the 
successful creation of an international historic bloc of social power that is based on 
“the articulation of a dominant ideology accepted by a subordinate group” (1991: 
76-77). This interaction between a dominant and subordinate group, in Roberts’ 
view, shows global governance to be a biopolitical force in that there is a disciplining 
of international systems of governance (2010: 37). This results in all members of the 
international system conforming to liberal political values by “reaching into 
supposedly sovereign territory and, where conformity is absent, punishing a state 
and its people” (Roberts, 2010: 37).  
The concept of global governmentality starts the process of bringing together 
a view of global governance and international politics based not only on the 
materialist critiques above but also the role of, and relationships between, power, 
knowledge and subjectivity in global governance, which tie into the concept of 
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biopolitics discussed in depth later. Governmentality, a concept elucidated by 
Foucault, describes three primary ideas. First, governmentality refers to the 
assemblage of “institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections…that allow for the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” through a knowledge 
system of political economy and the technical “apparatuses of security.” Second, 
governmentality for Foucault refers to the long-term tendency throughout the West 
for this form of this type of power, resulting in the formation of “a whole series of 
specific governmental apparatuses,” and the development “of a whole complex of 
knowledges.” Finally, Foucault argues that governmentality is the long term and 
historical trend for government to move from a “state of justice” to an 
“administrative state” which he refers to as state systems becoming 
“governmentalized” (Foucault, 2003: 244). 
Building off of Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Larner and Walters 
present global governmentality as filling a conceptual gap in understanding the 
“tactics, techniques, and technologies” that constitute governance of spaces beyond 
the state (2004: 1). They argue that this approach to understanding international 
governance allows scholars to “consider how governing involved particular 
representations, knowledges, and often expertise” within governed spaces beyond 
the state (Larner and Walters, 2004: 2). They further argue that while global 
governmentality does share with global governance the perspective that governance 
does not necessarily come from a single source, global governmentality allows for a 
specific focus on the “particular sets of forces, institutions, desires, and fears and 
constitute them as specific territorializations” (Larner and Walters, 2004: 16). In 
18 
 
this sense governmentality is a “loose set of analytical tools,” but this inherent 
weakness, for Walters, provides flexibility and adaptability that is able to account 
for the “subtle shifts in the rationalities, technologies, strategies, and identities of 
governance” (Walters, 2012: 3). The differences and similarities of global 
governance and global governmentality are described more in depth by Weidner, 
who argues that fundamentally, both perspectives attempt to seek out the source or 
sources of rule and order in “the absence of a clear state-based international order” 
(2009: 390). For Weidner, what separates the global governmentality perspective 
from other readings of global governance is the focus on the relationship between 
the production of subjectivity and the structures and relations of power constituted 
by governmental systems, which he argues is ignored both by liberal scholarship on 
global governance (2009: 390-391). Weidner argues further that the strength of 
global governmentality is precisely its ability to account for the way that underlying 
socio-political forces are “inscribed in thought” such that discourses of the global 
are “seen as a particular form of power/knowledge that makes possible and also 
forecloses different kinds of political practises and arrangements” (2009: 410).  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 Global governance in theory expresses the forms and methods of socio-
political power of international institutions. For Abbot and Snidal, international 
institutions offer states “functional attributes” through which global governance can 
be facilitated. Crucially, they argue that the primary functions of international 
institutions for state actors can be found in the centralizing and independent 
aspects of those organizations (Abbot and Snidal, 2005: 31-47). Moreover, they find 
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that beyond a state-centric viewpoint, IOs act also as community representatives 
and enforcers, setting norms and values for issue areas (Abbott and Snidal, 2005: 
48). Looking at international institutions through a neo-Gramscian perspective, Cox 
argues that international institutions function as the “process through which the 
institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed” by embodying the rules 
that allow for the expansion of a hegemonic international order, achieving 
legitimacy and support primarily from hegemonic actors, authenticating and 
justifying the ideological norms of the world order, co-opting elites from peripheral 
countries, and absorbing counter-hegemony (1983: 172).  Yet Woods argues that 
this sole focus on formal international institutions as the sole organ of global 
governances misses the fact that the processes of global governance are increasingly 
being undertaken by formal and informal institutions, institutional networks, 
complexes, and arrangements, beyond the gaze of the public and increasingly 
without the direct control of governments (2002).  
 While there is clearly contention over the primary site of global governance, 
there is no doubt that international institutions and organizations are a major part 
of the processes and structure of global governance. This section therefore reviews 
the literature on international institutions, focusing on three main themes. First, the 
theme of legitimacy and legitimization is discussed. Second, recent literature on 
international regime complexes is explored. Finally, literature on the role of norms 





The perennial question of international institution legitimacy is a key theme 
in the literature on IOs since legitimacy informs the broader functioning of these 
organizations and their fundamental ability to govern. This is especially true for 
Keohane, who argues that IO legitimacy takes a normative shape in that it asserts 
the institution’s “right to rule” (2011: 99).  Using a liberal democratic framework, 
Keohane explores what conditions are necessary for institutions to be considered 
legitimate (2011: 99). He argues that the standards of liberal democracy should be 
used to assess legitimacy at the international level, but that the threshold for 
meeting those standards should be low so as to allow for a greater ability to 
distinguish between institutions (Keohane 2011: 100). Keohane lists six measurable 
yet purposefully dynamic criteria by which observers and analysts can assess 
legitimacy, allowing for a set normative standard. These six measurable criteria are 
minimum moral acceptability, inclusiveness, epistemic quality, accountability, 
compatibility with national governance structures, and comparative benefit 
between institutions (Keohane 2011: 101-103). The assertion that legitimacy is 
measurable in a meaningful way is problematized by Cerutti, who argues that any 
debate about legitimacy at the international level assumes an answer to the 
question “legitimacy for whom?” (2011, 124). The problem for Cerutti is that 
assessing the legitimacy of IOs presupposes the ability to “determine the values and 
interests of such a universal, but fragmented group” (2011, 124). Unlike Keohane, 
who argues for a set of universal criteria on which legitimacy can be judged, Cerutti 
argues that legitimacy is not universalizable at the international level and instead 
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must be determined on a narrow, case-by-case basis (2011, 125). Panke adds to this 
discussion by arguing that states and state delegates within institutions sometimes 
are unable or unwilling to participate because of “real world structural differences 
between states,” which results in negative implications for legitimacy in those actor 
states (2017: 123, 138).  
 Brasset and Tsingou find that any attempt to positively identify legitimacy at 
an international level, just as Keohane and Cerutti have attempted, simply points to 
the ambiguity of the term (2011: 1). Further, they argue that attempting to 
positively define legitimacy quickly moves from ambiguity to contestability, since 
“one man’s legitimacy is another man’s domination” (Brassett and Tsingou, 2011: 
2). Crucial to Brassett and Tsingou’s exploration of the topic of legitimacy is the 
balance they argue for between legitimacy and legitimization, where legitimization 
is a dynamic social process, rather than the static ideals of legitimacy strictly defined 
(2011: 3).  
 Ultimately, the disagreement over how legitimacy should be framed and 
defined is overshadowed by the fact that legitimacy is still assumed to be a feature 
of global governance and international institutions, regardless of the shape it takes. 
For Tallberg and Zürn, legitimacy is a fundamental characteristic of international 
organizations that informs the “long-term capacity to deliver” on policies and issue 
areas in the eyes of national governments and the public (2019: 1). They argue, like 
Keohane, that legitimacy is an observable, empirical, yet varying concept that 
generally refers to the “beliefs of audiences that an IO’s authority is appropriately 
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exercised” (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019: 2). For the authors, legitimacy takes place 
through the dynamic process of legitimation (and delegitimation), which can be 
observed discursively through the texts and speech acts of institutions, or 
behaviourally through the “rules, procedures, or policies put in place by IOs with the 
aim to strengthen legitimacy” (Tallberg and Zürn, 2019: 8).  
This process of legitimation is further explored by Gronau and Schmidtke. 
Using the Weberian concept of “legitimate rule,” they argue that processes and 
strategies of legitimation differ depending on the constituencies addressed (2016: 
537). For the authors, legitimation is the interactive dynamic between authority on 
the one hand, and constituencies, who in this case consist of nations, the public, and 
also the civil servants who work within the international institutions (Gronau and 
Schmidtke, 2016: 537, 539). This interactive process of legitimation is based on “the 
insight that individuals do not attribute legitimacy to international institutions in a 
societal vacuum but are constantly influenced by many factors” such as policy and 
data output, crises, and legitimacy claims by other competing or interactive actors 
(Gronau and Schmidtke, 2016: 539). They argue that legitimation strategies are 
“goal-oriented activities employed to establish and maintain a reliable basis of 
diffuse support for a political regime by its social constituencies” (Gronau and 
Schmidtke, 2016: 540). The main contribution of Gronau and Schmidtke though is 
the incorporation of bureaucratic actors into the legitimation equation. With their 
usage of the Weberian “legitimate rule,” they take on Weber’s emphasis on the 
bureaucratic core of institutions, whose obedience to the institution for whom the 
bureaucrats work is tied to the bureaucrats’ belief in the legitimacy of that 
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institution (Gronau and Schmidtke, 2016: 544). In this case then, IOs use 
legitimation strategies employed to cultivate “positive legitimacy beliefs within an 
institution’s staff” by creating belief in the virtues of conformity and formal, 
procedural, yet abstract, “codification of impersonal rules” (Gronau and Schmidtke, 
2016: 545).  
The bureaucratic aspect of international organizations is a central point of 
this research and makes up an important component of internal influence within an 
organization. Yet the topic of international regime complexes must be addressed in 
order to understand external organizational influences on the functioning of 
international organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL REGIME COMPLEXES 
 
The discussion of the governance implications of the relationships between 
international institutions has been present since the post-World War II emergence 
of IOs as we know them today. Yet Ruggie finds that we are currently witnessing a 
“fundamental discontinuity” in the international political space (1993: 143). Writing 
at the end of the Cold War and the subsequent overhaul of the international system, 
Ruggie argues that the discontinuities, that is, the changes that the international 
system is undergoing, point to the possible emergence of postmodern modes of 
configuring and reconfiguring political space (1993: 144). For Ruggie, this takes the 
shape of an “unbundling of territoriality” as the force of the transformation of 
capitalist production fragments and, by virtue of “the logic of late capitalism,” 
reunifies the space (1993: 147, 171). It is this fragmented/unified space that Elsig 
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explores, arguing that part of understanding the functioning of modern-day 
international institutions is analyzing the “material and social preferences” of the 
proximate principals (agents that can act as principal or agent) within the 
organization (2010: 510). Using a principal-agent framework and focusing primarily 
on the relationship between states and the secretariats of different international 
organizations, Elsig finds that international organizations are constituted by the 
dynamic relationship between the organization, civil servants, and state actors 
(“sovereign principals”), who all act in some capacity as a principal and in that way 
gain influence (2010: 499-500). Yet Manulak argues that this focus on the internal 
aspects of principal-agent relationships between secretariats and sovereign 
princpals is simplified and misses two key points. First, the presence of multiple 
state principals within international organizations leads to competing views on the 
formation of secretariats and institutional design more broadly (Manulak, 2017: 
517). Second, at a micro-scale focused on the day-to-day political functioning of 
international organizations, it becomes clear that there is a high susceptibility to 
“informal modes of influence” (Manulak, 2017: 517). Both of these issues point 
towards an external force that shapes the functioning of international organizations. 
While Manulak and Elsig might point to the state as the primary external force, the 
literature explored below shows that the interaction between international 
organizations in “regime complexes” has become a powerful source of influence and 
fundamental site for working out global governance. A major point of debate among 
those looking at global governance is the importance and influence of the internal 
minutiae of IO functions, and whether and to what extent international regime 
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complexes act as an external force shaping and even determining those functions 
and their effects.  
 Simply put, an international regime complex is the phenomenon of 
overlapping, nested or parallel international organizations outside of a hierarchical 
ordering system (Alter and Meunier, 2009: 13). Alter and Meunier argue that the 
major issue with regime complexes is that they blur the lines of legal obligation “by 
introducing overlapping sets of legal rules and jurisdictions governing an issue” 
(2009: 17). For the authors, regime complexity leads not only to this fragmentation 
of law and rules within and between organizations, but leads to forum-shopping, an 
increased reliance on heuristics because of the blurring of rules and standards, a 
shift towards the formation of insular small groups within institutions, and the 
undermining of accountability through the increased difficulty of determining who 
has jurisdiction over what issue area (Alter and Meunier 2009: 16-20). For Raustiala 
and Victor, the proliferation of international regime complexes is a product of the 
more general increase in institutional density since the end of the Cold War (2004: 
295). Using an analysis of the institutional regime complexity on plant genetic 
resources, they argue that regime complexes mark a shift in the site of institutional 
action away from “elemental regimes,” a term used Rausitala and Victor to refer to 
groupings of international agreements, towards “legal inconsistencies that tend to 
arise at the joints between regimes” (Rausitala and Victor, 2004: 306). Moreover, 
they find that whereas these elemental regimes often make rules on a “clean 
institutional slate,” the ambiguity of regime complex rules emerge from a dense 
backdrop of rules, which leads to those legal inconsistencies (Rausitala and Victor, 
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2004: 306). Ultimately, this shifts the method of rule change towards a bottom-up 
system, away from the traditionally assumed top-down approach (Rausitala and 
Victor, 2004: 306).  
 Gehring and Faude argue that these characteristics of emerging institutional 
regime complexes establish “permanent patterns of institutional co-governance” 
and the necessity for inter-institutional divisions of labour (2014: 473). Focusing 
primarily on regulatory institutional complexes, the authors differ from other 
scholars examining regime complexes by arguing that the preference for functional 
overlap may be a “purposive action of state actors” in order to drive competition 
within institutions as those actors vie for power (Gehring and Faude, 2014: 474-
475). This is done primarily through forum-shopping, where state actors can 
strategically choose institutional alignment that best suits their policy needs 
(Gehring and Faude, 2014: 476). This competition is also present externally, 
between institutions that are intertwined within functional overlap. Gehring and 
Faude argue that institutions performing similar tasks within similar issue areas 
must compete over governance functions and resources, and ultimately authority 
over the area of functional overlap (2014: 475). For Urpelainen, states can exert this 
power-based pursuit within IOs, especially on bureaucrats, because of the 
permeable nature of international organizations (2012: 708). 
 Overlapping functional areas and forum-shopping are explored in greater 
depth by Busch. Busch, analyzing dispute settlement mechanisms within the WTO, 
argues that forum-shopping provides a way for complainants to shape future 
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governance by determining between overlapping membership, allowing for a choice 
on whether or not to set a precedent on a given measure (2007: 735). That is, the 
legal victory of a complainant over a defendant in an international dispute 
mechanism has future ramifications on its relationship between itself and other 
members of that institution, therefore institutional actors forum-shop in order to 
determine where a precedent would be more useful (Busch, 2007: 757). Busch 
notes that there are two implications from his findings on the larger picture of 
forum-shopping beyond international trade disputes. First, he argues that forum-
shopping shows that who is allowed within institutions can end up being an 
institutional constraint, since it determines who will be allowed to have standing at 
negotiations (Busch, 2007: 758). Second, forum-shopping points towards a deeper 
understanding of institutional design, since, if it is promoted, institutions are seen to 
be “investing in flexibility” (Busch, 2007, 758).  
 Abstracted from member decision-making to the level of institutions as 
primary actors, forum-shopping becomes institutional deference, which is discussed 
by Pratt (2018). He argues that institutional deference is a coordinated attempt at 
rulemaking within a fragmented global governance arena and is vital to the 
functioning of multilateral cooperation and decision-making (Pratt 2018: 562). Just 
like forum-shopping, deference has a decentralizing effect as institutions use it to 
“successfully resolve jurisdictional conflicts in the absence of clear legal hierarchy” 
within a system of fragmented, independent rulemaking by institutions (Pratt, 2018: 
563-564). From a legal perspective, deference mimics the legal principle of 
“conflicts of laws” as institutions with seemingly identical jurisdiction and rule sets 
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attempt to determine, and ultimately delegate authority through deference (Pratt, 
2018: 567).  
INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE AND NORM DIFFUSION 
 
 The fundamental issue at the heart of international regime complexes are the 
rules and norms of the institutions. Meyer and Rowan argued thirty years ago that 
the process of institutionalization is at its core a process “by which social 
processes…come to take on rule-like status in social thought and action” (1977, 
341). They argue that institutions become structured around the “myths of their 
institutional environment” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). Moreover, they argue 
that it is the norms and rules of institutions which act as the place and mechanisms 
of legitimization, since “institutions inevitably involve normative obligations…which 
must be taken into account by actors” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341). Barnett and 
Finnemore take Meyer and Rowan’s ideas a step further when they argue that the 
power of international institutions to set norms stems from the rational-legal 
authority granted to international organizations (1999: 699). This rational-legal 
authority is embodied by and embedded within the bureaucracies that make up 
international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 700). For the authors, 
while IO bureaucracies gain legitimacy through their relationship with states, the 
recognitions of the embeddedness of a rational-legal authority within the 
bureaucracies helps to move away from seeing IOs simply as arenas for state pursuit 
of global governance goals towards IOs being purposive actors themselves (Barnett 
and Finnemore, 1999: 726). With this autonomy and authority, Barnett and 
Finnemore argue that IOs use their ability to structure knowledge to act to classify 
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the world, fix meanings in the social world, and “articulate and diffuse new norms, 
principles, and actors” around the globe (1999: 710). 
 In Rules for the World, Barnett and Finnemore contend that starting an 
analysis of international organizations from the assumption that they are inherently 
bureaucracies helps to generate a different set of expectations, away from the 
traditional focus of IOs as simple problem-solving, welfare-improving governmental 
bodies that are vacuous until a state actor act through them (2004: viii, ix). They 
argue that this traditional focus quickly falls apart when international organizations 
are seen developing and pursuing their own ideas and agendas (2004: 2). When it 
comes to norms and discourse, Barnett and Finnemore find that IOs viewed as 
bureaucratic actors can be seen as shaping “both how the world is constituted” and 
the global governance agenda need “for acting in it” (2004: 7). This view of 
institutions fits within Lieberman’s concept of the “ideational approach” to 
understanding international organizations (2002: 698). This approach places ideas 
at the centre of institutional decision making, moving away from traditional 
institutional theories which take the aims and actions of individuals as purely 
rational and always a given (Lieberman, 2002: 698). Anderson expands on this, 
arguing that “political actors’ interests are not mutually pre-determined” but are 
rather “constructed ideationally” and dynamically in response to normative beliefs 
(2008: 278). The ideational process as it relates to institutional policy change is best 
articulated by Béland, who argues that ideational processes “impact the ways policy 
actors perceive their interests and the environment in which they mobilize (2009: 
701). Béland uses Parsons’ definition of ideas, which are “claims about descriptions 
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of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” 
(Parsons, 2002: 48 in Béland, 2009: 702). For Béland, there are three ways that 
ideational processes impact actors in this way: through shaping “the problems and 
issues that enter the policy agenda,” by constructing “the assumptions that impact 
the content of reform proposals,” and lastly by becoming “discursive weapons” in 
the formation of  imperatives (2009: 702).  
 In practise, a focus on norms and ideas in institutions allows for a broader 
understanding of how institutions function. In tracing the theoretical approaches of 
norm creation through United Nations gender equality initiatives, Krook and True 
find that the dominant (constructivist) perspective of norms at the international 
level tends to see norms as fixed and bounded ideas (2012: 104). They argue instead 
that norms become diffuse at the international level, and that this “evasive nature” 
offers greater analytical flexibility “for explaining why norms emerge and appear to 
diffuse rapidly (Krook and True, 2012: 104-105). The authors show this by 
approaching norms from a discursive perspective, where norms are tied to language 
and created through speech acts, which helps establish those norms as broadly 
institutionalized and permanent (Krook and True, 2012: 105). They show this by 
providing a case study for their theory that traces the evolution of gender 
mainstreaming as an international institutional norm. By analyzing gender-balanced 
decision-making, and gender mainstreaming in the UN, Krook and True find that 
norms can be both more and less dynamic depending on content and meanings 
(2012: 123).  
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 Finally, Haas helps bring together ideas of power discussed above in the 
section on global governmentality with the concepts of ideation and norms within 
international organizations. He argues that the control over ideas, knowledge, and 
norm diffusion is a central part of the power of institutions since “the diffusion of 
new ideas and information can lead to new patters of behaviour and prove to be an 
important determinant of international policy coordination” (Haas, 1992: 2-3). It is 
this power for Haas that binds members of institutions in “epistemic communities,” 
which are characterized by shared principles and normative beliefs, shared causal 
beliefs, shared notions of knowledge validity and intersubjectivity, and a common 
framework for dealing with the specific set of issues tasked to the group (1992: 3), 
such as food security in the case of the FAO. 
FOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
 
 The study of food security takes many forms, spanning across multiple fields 
and disciplines. McKeon lists several entry points to studying food security, 
including agricultural models, nutrition and health, human rights, and economic 
justice (2015: 6). This issue is addressed as well by Pottier, who finds that food 
security governance as a concept is concerned with “interconnected domains” such 
as agriculture, nutrition, environment, income, policy, and society, making food 
security as well as its governance a contested set of concepts (1999: 11). 
Schanbacher argues further that this interconnectedness is a permanent feature, not 
a bug that must be resolved, as it is impossible to detach food security from the 
discourse of agriculture, trade, global poverty, and economic development (2010: 
1). The entry point for this thesis is of course through understanding the governance 
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structures of food security. This section therefore focuses on two areas of the 
literature on food security governance. First, I discuss the literature on food security 
and food security governance in theory. Second, I look at food security governance 
in practise, focusing on the institutional aspects of food security. 
FOOD SECURITY IN THEORY 
 
Food security, as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization, “exists 
when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, 
and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (FAO, 2006).  This definition is set by the FAO primarily to 
inform their research work and policy in member nations, but the breadth and 
inclusion of multiple factors like physical and economic access, dietary needs, 
preferences, health, physical activity, for all people always, clearly presents the 
difficulty in pinning down what, in a practical sense, food security is. This is echoed 
by Patricia Allen when she argues that there is wide divergence in how food security 
is framed and defined based on who is doing the defining, and what they are 
presupposing to be the solution to food insecurity (2013: 135-38). 
Candel extends this debate over the issue of food security governance 
framing and priorities into academia. Using systematic discourse analysis, he finds 
that much of the literature on food security and food security governance is focused 
on an “ideal state” of food security rather than the present state of food security 
norms and policies (Candel, 2014). He finds that food security governance is framed 
primarily with a problem-solving lens, and that this literature does not address the 
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question of how food security and food security governance is defined (2014: 598). 
Given the breadth and depth of the topic of food security governance, Candel argues 
that it is difficult to pin down a specific definition of what is meant by “food security 
governance” in particular (2014: 598). While McKeon sees the wide variety of entry 
points into understanding food security academically as a testament to the variety 
of issues “food security” entails, Candel notes that this lack of specificity of 
methodology and approaches to food security points to a difficulty in studying it 
empirically (2014: 586). Lang and Barling explore this in their attempt to 
reformulate food security policy objectives for the 21st century. They argue that 
there is a mismatch between food security policy and food security reality, resulting 
in a “considerable rupture in the discourse” (Lang and Barling, 2012: 313). They 
find that this is due to both a merger of food security and food sustainability 
discourses at the policy-making level, but also simply the juggling of actors, 
evidence, interests, and scale that is involved in dealing with food security as a 
policy issue (Lang and Barling, 2012: 323).  
This wide variation of themes built into the concept of food security is 
termed by Sonnino et al. as “multiple vulnerabilities” and are only effectively 
addressed when approached using a discursive lens (2016: 477). The authors also 
indirectly address the merger of sustainability and food security discourses by using 
“sustainable food security” as the object of their place-based, discursive framework 
for addressing food security (Sonnino et al., 2016: 486). They argue that this place-
based approach, that is, focusing first and foremost on the policy spaces of food 
security, “offers the conceptual advantage of building far more complexity and 
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diversity into generalised and aggregated food security debates” (Sonnino et al., 
2016: 487). Jarosz builds on this geographic conceptualization of food security by 
questioning the role of scale in how food security is understood (2011: 117). She 
traces the shift in the definition of food security from its inception where it was 
focused on attaining food security at national and regional levels, to the current 
framework that links “individuals and households to global modalities of 
governance and technical interventions in agriculture” (Jarosz, 2011: 118). Jarosz 
argues that this had deepened poorer countries dependency on neoliberal, free 
market foodstuff prices (2011: 118). Moreover, the connection between the 
individual/household and global food supply management and governance results 
in “the commodification of food and conditions food access to revenue, capital and 
individual income and wages,” further resulting in the devolution and diffusion of 
responsibility for the hunger of others (Jarosz, 2011: 121).  
Hendricks also attempts to deal with the complexity of food security and the 
debate over food security governance by arguing that the debate is complicated by 
the lack of differentiation between “the risk factors for food insecurity, food 
insecurity as a phenomenon in itself and the consequences of food insecurity” 
(2015: 610). The definitional problem at the heart of this debate, she argues, comes 
down to determining and setting out a system of measurement from which a 
definition can be gathered (Hendricks, 2015:  610). Shepherd argues that this 
measurement can come from analysis of food security as an issue of human security 
(2012, 195). He finds that there are two aspects that need to be examined for food 
security to be fully understood: “food security behaviours by empowered actors” 
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and “hunger as widespread human insecurity” (Shepherd, 2012: 208). For 
Shepherd, the main focus of food security and food security governance should be 
de-centered away from a passive, institutional framing of the problem, and re-
centered around the idea of securing vulnerable people “from the structural 
violence of hunger” (2012: 206). He argues that the strength of this re-centered food 
security analysis is that it is active, and that it “provides a normative position that 
can (must) be used by actors to validate and evaluate the actions of others,” 
therefore forcing accountable policy-making (Shepherd, 2012: 206). Shepherd 
provides one pathway towards controlling food security as a policy issue, but it 
should be clear that this issue is interdisciplinary and therefore impossible to boil 
down into one single policy path. Further, pathways of accountability are unclear, 
making it difficult to identify who is accountable to whom. The next section will deal 
with the some of the problems faced in the governance of food security.  
FOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN PRACTISE 
 
McKeon argues that the focus on food governance is crucial for the present 
era “because we are getting very close to the absolute ecological, socio-economic, 
and political limits” of our current “unsustainable and inequitable food system” 
(2015: 6). This food system is internationalized in particular ways that make it 
unique to the study of global governance. For Clapp and Cohen, the system has 
become fragmented and incoherent because it is based on frameworks from 
historical conditions, past practises, and past understandings of food systems and 
food security (2009: 6). Margulis argues that the current food security governance 
regime is internationalized purely because the complexity and fragmentary nature 
36 
 
of the issue which is beyond the capabilities of any one individual state (2015: 53). 
For Margulis, this complexity is tied into the global financial markets and food 
commodification, creating, along with the historical evolution of the governance 
system, a global policy framework with the technocratic capabilities of international 
organizations (2015: 54). Yet this framework is inherently centred in the conflict 
found in regime complexes. For Margulis, there are three competing policy 
frameworks attempting to “deal with” food security: agriculture and production, 
international trade, and human security and human rights (2012: 60). While this 
regime complex is conflictual in nature, Margulis argues that without recognizing 
the interconnected relationship between these three institutional frameworks on 
food security, the ability to address global hunger and food insecurity will be 
negatively impacted (2012: 65).  
 This interconnectedness has led to regime overlap, as discussed above. The 
history of food security governance is directly tied into agricultural and economic 
development not only in the FAO, but also through trade mechanisms in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). This is explored briefly by Lawrence and McMichael, 
who argue that the neoliberal turn in international politics and governance in the 
1980s created food import dependency in the Global South as countries with the 
political and economic might shaped trade regulations and created subsidies 
through domestic agricultural policy to benefit themselves (2012: 135). This has led 
to a situation currently where countries no longer have sovereignty over the 
production and international flow of their own foodstuff (Lawrence and McMichael, 
2012: 136). Friedmann argues that this global food order “reflects international 
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power through the complementary national policies that constitute it” (1982: 254-
255). Friedmann adds to this by arguing that the neoliberal global food order is 
significant since it has led to a “widening and deepening of capitalist relations within 
the world economy” through the repositioning of the world’s population away from 
direct access to their own foodstuffs, and towards liberalized food markets, making 
food security subject to market dictates more than ever before (1982: 255). 
 This market-based global food order broke down in 2007/2008 with a global 
food crisis. Fouilleux et al. argue that the food security debates that were 
reinvigorated around this time centered around a call for increasing food 
production, although the lack of production was not the cause of the food crisis 
(2017: 1659). The authors argue that the discourse on production within food 
security governance is a “productionist trap,” a concept they use to refer to the 
phenomenon where there is a “tendency to reduce the complex food security issue 
to a need to increase production” (Fouilleux et al., 2017: 1662). The discursive 
power of this institutional framework stems from “the simplicity and general nature 
of the productionist paradigm” and “the ability of hegemonic actors to develop 
multilevel strategies for its promotion” (Fouilleux et al., 2017: 1672). While this 
literature focuses on important aspects of the larger debate on food security 
governance, there are also crucial framing debates happening within international 
institutions, and particularly within the FAO.  
 The FAO’s main function as a specialized agency of the United Nations is the 
international regulation of food and agriculture, and therefore it deals directly with 
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ensuring the security of food. Yet as Duncan and Claeys note, this is not a neutral 
policy endeavour. They argue that the dynamic nature of food security and the 
contestation over its definition has led to a policy problem “for which there is no 
neutral diagnosis” (Duncan and Claeys, 2018: 1412). This results in the continuous 
politicization of food security within the FAO, which, on the one hand, allows for 
hegemonic powers such as the US and Private Sector Mechanisms to try and take 
back control, while on the other hand allowing “re-building food systems as it makes 
counter-hegemonic positions both visible and possible while re-invigorating policy 
processes” (Duncan and Claeys, 2018: 1421). The political debates that are part of 
this politicization is one of three major debates taking place in the FAO, as identified 
by González, the others being scientific debates, and ethical debates (2010, 1345). 
Jarosz argues that the political aspect of the food security debate is the central 
driver of FAO through the political-economic and foreign policy goals of the United 
States (2009: 55). Furthermore, she finds, like Fouilleux et al., that the dominant 
discourse of the FAO has been to push agricultural production, alongside economic 
development and trade liberalization, as the main solutions to food security globally 
(Jarosz, 2009: 55). Nevertheless, there have been attempts at reform within the FAO 
in light of these criticisms, although the success of these reforms is mixed, as 
Gustafson and Markie note. They argue that current attempts to reform and 
modernize the organization has led to a lack of consensus on how issues of food 
security and hunger are to be framed, what they call the one of the major challenges 
of international governance reforms (2009: 157). While the FAO was established 
with narrow humanitarian intentions and fairly clear guidelines, Gustafson and 
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Markie point to the “perfect storm of inactivity” which necessitated reform, created 
by disagreement on framing and priorities between the secretariat and members, 
and a chronic lack of funding (2009: 160). 
CONCLUSION 
 
The literature on global governance and international institutions points to 
the interconnected, difficult to define, and politicized ways that we deal with global 
issues like food security. Global governance and global governmentality illustrate 
the conflicts at the heart of the global system and how the politics of knowledge 
creation, legitimation, and dissemination are mutually constitutive of the structures 
and procedures by which IOs set the global political agenda and make and enact 
policy. The practical aspects of this is found in the literature on international 
institutions, which shows how complex the political undertakings of states and 
actors within institutions can get, particularly in the midst of overlapping 
institutions, interconnected legal frameworks and rule sets, and forum-shopping. 
These characteristics outline the influence the internal and external forces have on 
knowledge creation, norm formation, and norm diffusion, which are key functions of 
regulatory institutions like the FAO. Finally, the case of food security and food 
security governance highlights the contestation of norms, the overlap of institutions, 
and the difficult balance the FAO faces between politicization, hegemonic influence, 
and the moral objectives at the foundation of the organization.  
 This literature ultimately provides the groundwork for the rest of the 
research in this thesis, which is focused precisely on the discursive politics of 
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knowledge formation on food security within the FAO. The scholarship on food 
security, international institutions, and global governance provide different scopes 
of analysis and entry points for understanding how the FAO functions and why it 
functions the way it does. Although investigating and understanding these 
discursive frameworks and regime complexes is crucial, it does not tell the whole 
story. As I argue below, it is vital to understand the biopolitical functions of these 
discursive frameworks and regime complexes. Including biopolitics in this 
discussion helps to unravel the way that international organizations, like the FAO in 















The above introduction to global governance, international institutions, and 
food security governance makes clear that the FAO governance operates a complex 
system for a complex problem. In order to analysis this system, this chapter 
introduces the theoretical and methodological approaches taken. This allows for a 
clearer picture of how the FAO, and specifically the Committee for World Food 
Security (CFS) functions, and ultimately helps to answer the questions posed in the 
introduction.  
 First, the concepts of biopolitics and biopower are outlined through a 
discussion of Foucault and Agamben’s definitions of the concept. This debate is built 
upon to find a middle ground between Foucault’s particular and narrow view of 
biopolitics and Agamben’s broad understanding of biopolitics. Second, the 
methodologies of discursive, or constructivist institutionalism and critical discourse 
analysis are introduced as the frameworks used to explore the discursive practises 
within the CFS, that is, the reports and documents produced by the Committee. 
Using both of these theoretical and methodological approaches allows for a deeper 
understanding of the biopolitical functions of the CFS. 
BIOPOWER AND BIOPOLITICS 
 
“Biopolitics” and “biopower” are terms popularized by Foucault towards the 
end of his life, yet he did not write or lecture on the topic in detail. Instead, Foucault 
often used “biopower” and “biopolitics” either as a jumping off point to discuss 
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other topics, as in his lectures Society Must Be Defended (1976-1977), Security, 
Territory, Population (1977-1978), and Birth of Biopolitics (1978-1979), or briefly in 
his writing, as in History of Sexuality, Volume 1. This has left many scholars agreeing 
that biopower and biopolitics are both unfinished concepts and are therefore 
limited (Agamben, 1998; Cisney and Morar, 2016; Patton, 2016; Mills, 2016). 
Nevertheless, efforts have been made, particularly by Agamben, to build on the 
concepts and expand them into more useful analytical tools. Therefore, in order to 
make sense of these concepts and their theoretical utility for the purposes of this 
thesis, it is important to first go over how Foucault originally understood biopower 
and biopolitics. Second, I look briefly at Agamben as an example of the work that has 
been done to further the analytical and theoretical utility of biopolitics. Third, I 
explore more recent theorists’ work on biopolitics in order to gain a fuller picture of 
the concept to finally build a working theoretical definition to be used in my 
analysis. 
 Foucault most succinctly discusses and defines “biopower” and “biopolitics” 
at the end of the first volume of History of Sexuality. He argues that the power of the 
sovereign over life and death has evolved significantly in Western politics, especially 
since the 17th century. This time is identified by Foucault as a crucial point of the 
“power over life” splitting into two separate poles. First, he argues that the 
sovereign sought power over the individual body through discipline, or what he 
calls “anatomo-politics”. Second, and more importantly, is the sovereign’s regulatory 
intervention over the “species body,” or power over the biological processes of the 
population as a whole, which is biopolitics (Foucault, 1990: 139). For Foucault, the 
43 
 
rise of biopower led to the “investment of the body, its valorization, and the 
distributive management of its forces” as machines of production and was 
fundamental to the parallel development of capitalism (1990: 141). In this same 
timeframe, sovereign powers, usually, but not always, taking the form of the state, 
institutionalized biopolitics through the creation of “techniques of power” such as 
the school, the family, medicine, and corporate and political administration or 
bureaucracy. The increase of productivity and economic development in the 18th 
and 19th centuries led to further regulatory intervention through the development 
of “fields of knowledge concerned with life” such as agriculture, demographics, and 
the “probabilities of life” as measured by disciplines such as pathology and 
nutritional sciences (Foucault, 1990: 142). That is, these fields of knowledge were 
co-opted by the state in an attempt to regulate and standardize the lived experience 
of populations. 
Yet as Foucault goes on to state, biopolitics does not mean that power over 
life has been fully integrated into the techniques of power and governance, but 
exactly the opposite: life constantly escapes regulation and control. For Foucault, 
this is evident in the fact that large scale famine and food scarcity still persist 
despite governance systems and regulatory regimes aimed precisely at alleviating 
or even eradicating those phenomena (1990: 143). Biopower, according to Foucault, 
is therefore an analysis of the application of power, and not a theory of power in 
itself. He argues that biopolitics describes the mechanisms of the objectification of 
“basic biological features” within political strategy, which is a feature of a more 
general strategy of power (Foucault, 2009: 1-2).  
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After laying down this foundation, Foucault argues that one main mechanism 
of biopolitics is security, which he defines as a phenomenon which seeks to 
“respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to 
which it responds,” where the reality is one of scarcity (2009: 47). That is, security 
becomes the sovereign’s ability to make populations legible to its power, which is 
managerial and administrative power over the material and biological functions of 
populations. The sovereign’s ability to make populations legible to its power occurs 
through security, since for Foucault, security acts as the mechanism for objectifying 
“basic biological features” of individual and social life by quantifying data “as it is” 
rather than looking for or casting moral judgement on the data. To illustrate this 
point, Foucault uses the example of the evolution of vaccinations and variolation to 
show that these medical advancements both act as a form of security and integrate 
into the mechanism of security a central dynamic between basic biological features 
and chance, probability, and statistics (2009: 59). Thus, the biopolitical, through 
security, acts not as “extensive surveillance of the individual” but instead attaches 
specific phenomena that are not quite individualized to the population. The 
population is the space of biopower when it is framed by “regulatory apparatuses,” 
since the population is fundamentally a “datum that depends on a series of 
variables” (Foucault, 2009: 71). The population becomes not a collective of 
individuals but a set of constitutive elements containing constants and regularities, 
extending “from biological rootedness through the species” up to the public surface. 
For Foucault therefore, the population is a politicized and quantified concept of 
Homo sapiens as a biological being, and the “end and instrument of government” 
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enumerated by statistics (2009: 74-75, 105). Here Foucault argues that 
“government” is no longer exclusively related to territory, but a sovereign “complex 
of men and things” like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and population 
(2009, 96). Population appears in this relationship to be both the subject of 
government through the recognition of needs and aspirations, while also being the 
object of governmental manipulation. Foucault writes that “vis-à-vis government, 
[population] is both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to 
it.” (2009, 104-105). Through this attempted individualization of the population, 
Foucault limits biopolitics as being inherent to a neoliberal governmentality. 
Agamben argues that this analysis of power through biopolitics marks 
Foucault’s abandonment of traditional forms of power “in favour of an unprejudiced 
analysis of the concrete ways in which power penetrates subjects’ very bodies and 
forms of life” (1998: 5). For Agamben, this is incorrect, as he argues that sovereign, 
or traditional power, is not separate from biopolitics, but the main force of 
biopower and biopolitics. He argues against Foucault’s assertion that biopolitics is 
simply the “inclusion of men’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of 
power,” arguing instead that there is no longer any distinction between “natural life” 
and “political life,” or qualified life (Agamben, 1998: 119-120; O’Donough, 2015). 
Agamben illustrates this point using the legal concept of habeas corpus. He argues 
that the origin of this concept in the 18th century is significant, since the subject was 
neither the ancient feudal subject or the individual citizen, but simply a corpus, or 
body. He further argues that the new biopolitics is therefore that the bearer of 
rights, the sovereign subject, can only be constituted as such through the isolation 
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and presentation of one’s body (Agamben: 1998: 124). Since the sovereign is the 
root of biopolitical power, and the body constituted and subjugated by the sovereign 
is the biopolitical subject, Agamben concludes by arguing that all of Western politics 
is biopolitics. For Agamben, the only way to understand Western politics is to first 
start with the awareness of the death of distinction between natural and qualified 
life, or the living being and the political being (1998: 187).  
Agamben’s claim of biopolitics being universal severely limits its analytical 
utility. Mills argues that for Agamben, the merger of natural life with political life, 
“such that biopolitics is just politics,” leads to a concept that is without limit, and is 
therefore analytically inert (2015, 88). Instead, as noted above, biopolitics is 
specifically limited to neoliberal governmentality. Most importantly though, 
biopolitics is not built on the political containment and encapsulation of life as 
Agamben argues, but that biopower in practise is systematically reactionary to the 
“errancy internal to life,” or the nature of life to elude capture or regulation, 
constantly forcing biopolitical governmental actors to “respond to the contingencies 
of the living and the phenomena of life” (Mills, 2015: 98). Put another way, 
biopolitics and biopower are simply reacting to the political conditions of the 
production and reproduction of life, rather than actively and successfully 
encapsulating that same errancy as Agamben argues (Negri, 2015: 61). In 
responding to these political conditions through a biopolitical reaction, the state or 
source of institutional power seeks not the betterment of the life of the population, 
but the intensification of political domination by the ruling class and continued 
economic control (Gros, 2015: 268). For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on 
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institutional power, and, in particular, the FAO. The FAO, and several other 
regulatory international organizations like it, acts as an aggregator of biopolitical 
power, generated through internal political processes and external political 
pressure as discussed in the previous chapter.  
With these arguments in mind, it is possible to move away from the 
universalism of Agamben’s biopower and go back to Foucault’s original intentions 
for his conception of biopower and biopolitics. It is therefore not a theory that can 
stand apart, but a primary mechanism of a much larger system of power and 
security. In the context of the FAO, the regulation of biological processes related to 
food from production to consumption at a global scale clearly illustrates how these 
mechanisms of biopower function within the more general neoliberal international 
political economy. The FAO acts as a regulatory apparatus within an international 
power structure whose mission is to respond and react to the “contingencies of the 
living and the phenomena of life” (Mills, 2015: 98). This formal institutional setting 
of biopolitics within the FAO is built primarily on discursive and ideational 
processes that construct populations as objects of biopower, especially by 
identifying and quantifying food insecurity and hunger, and then defining and 
limiting the range of legitimate interventions and solutions. I will examine these 
processes as they work within and through the FAO using discursive institutionalist 
and critical discourse analysis methodologies.  
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DISCURSIVE INSTITUTIONALISM AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
 
The most accessible way to understand how the FAO functions as a 
biopolitical organization is through its institutional discourse. The term “discourse” 
is often used to portray an ambivalence towards language, where language is simply 
assumed to be self-evident, and the content of the discourse operates to reinforce a 
prescribed meta/mega-narratives (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000: 1145; Alvesson 
and Kärreman, 2011: 1141). Critical discourse analysis and discursive 
institutionalism are here used to counter this tendency. When used together, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) and discursive institutionalism act in tandem to not only 
capture the larger discursive narratives, but also the lower level phenomena of 
language as the site where agents create biopolitical knowledge and use it in service 
to biopower.  
 Critical discourse analysis, or CDA, refers to a specific method of discourse 
analysis that is focused broadly on investigating discourse as a form of social 
behaviour and “the linguistic character of socio-cultural processes and structures” 
in order to understand power in discourse and power over discourse (Titscher et al., 
2000: 146). More specifically, Fairclough argues that CDA as a methodology is 
centred on the analysis of the semiotic or “meaning-making” aspects of discourse at 
an analytical level, and the relationship between these elements of discourse and 
broader elements of discourse and the discursive formations in which they operate 
and which they help constitute, like social order, or in the case of the FAO, 
institutional elements (2011: 122). This methodology follows the steps of discourse 
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analysis more broadly in that it first identifies the site of the discourse, or the 
“discursive plane”, followed by a processing of materials, a structural analysis, and a 
fine analysis of select documents (Jäger, 2011: 52). CDA differs from a more general 
understanding of discourse analysis in that it includes an analysis of the 
fundamental social processes embedded within discourse. CDA’s central focus is on 
analyzing the “opaque and transparent structural relationships of 
dominance…manifested in language” (Hucking et al., 2012: 107). Proponents of this 
methodology argue that it sees discourse as the primary site of ideological 
formation and transformation and allows researchers to “pinpoint the everyday 
manifestations and displays of social problems” (Van Dijk, 1985: 7). Moreover, 
discourse in this methodology is understood as pointing toward the ways that 
institutions, centred within the dominant class, create meaning and particular ways 
of talking about life (Kress, 1985: 28; Seidel, 1985: 46). What makes this 
methodology useful in the analysis of the FAO, food security knowledge production 
and biopolitics is its synthesis with the methodology of discursive institutionalism, 
which brings CDA into the realm of political science and away from its formal 
semiotic and linguistic focus.  
 Fairclough, an early proponent of CDA, argues that the political element of 
CDA is found in its ability to trace the movement of political activity in that political 
actors put forward certain “sources of action” through “deliberation over what 
should be done,” effectively operationalizing discourse, or putting it into action 
(Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, 2013: 180, 194). Yet CDA scholars 
limit the incorporation of politics into the methodology by broadly defining and 
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abstracting it as another variable (Zienkowski, 2019: 136). Incorporating discursive 
institutionalism into CDA allows for the inclusion of a specific understanding of 
political activity and political actors. Discursive institutionalism falls under the 
broader umbrella of neo-institutional approaches to political science, and is highly 
interpretive, setting it apart from the more analytical methodology of CDA. It is 
focused primarily on policy transformation and knowledge creation at the 
institutional level, examining the normative or “substantive ideas developed and 
conveyed by ‘sentient’ agents in discursive interactions” (Schmidt, 2011: 107). Ideas 
form the core of discursive institutionalism, where they are understood to be 
concepts formed in relation to other ideas and to actors (Carstensen, 2011: 612).  
Within formal institutions, the very structure of the organization affects the 
ordering of these relations of ideas to other ideas and actors, or ideational 
processes, as it rigidly establishes “who can talk to whom about what, where and 
when” (Schmidt, 2011, 120). This structure is bound specifically by a “shared belief 
or faith in the verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge and specific 
truths” (Haas, 1992: 3). This structure, which Haas calls epistemic communities, is 
responsible primarily “for circumscribing the boundaries” of rationality, thereby 
limiting the discursive and ideational processes. In the case of the FAO, this 
rationality is biopolitical. I show this in the next chapter through an analysis of food 
security assessments and session reports of the Committee for World Food Security, 








The history of the FAO offers some context for the analysis of food security 
governance and illustrates the points brought up in the previous chapter. But before 
going into a historical account of the FAO, and finally the Committee on World Food 
Security, it is important to understand the organizational context within which both 
of these organizations operate. The FAO is a Specialized Agency of the UN, which is a 
category of UN organizations that carry out the governance goals through 
negotiated agreements. Currently there are 17 specialized agencies of varying scope 
(UN, 2019). The need for Specialized Agencies arose out of the desire to embed the 
technical aspects of international post-war reconstruction within the UN system. 
These agencies were placed under the management of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), one of the primary organs of the UN system, although the 
agencies were purposefully given a measure of autonomy (Williams, 1987: 3-4) 
Initially, the Specialized Agencies were to function primarily as institutional sources 
of specialized information in order to assist in the creation of international 
standardization, but as the international political environment changed from the 
1940s to the 1950s, the specialized agencies became organizations of technical 
assistance for the Third World (Williams, 1987: 15).  
Even as these organizations became more generalized towards technical 
assistance rather than international standardization, distinctions grew between the 
types of organizations. Williams argues that there are four categories of specialized 
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agencies: the “Big Five,” which are UNESCO, FAO, WHO, ILO, and the UNIDO; 
technical and regulatory organizations like ITU, UPU, IMO, WMO, ICAO, WIPO, IAEA, 
and sometimes WHO; the Bretton Woods organizations (World Bank, IMF, WTO); 
and organs of ECOSOC such as UNICEF and UNCTAD (1987: 26-31). The “Big Five” 
are separated out because, as Williams argues, their mandate is broad enough to 
encompass the political, economic, and social life of most states in which they 
operate. While these categories are not strict, the FAO is certainly among the largest 
and most broadly mandated of the specialized agencies.  
The FAO is made up of Governing Bodies, Statutory Bodies, and Departments, 
all of which are tasked with working to fulfill the mandate of the organization. 
Governing Bodies are defined by the constitution of the FAO as defining overall 
policies, establishing strategic plans and frameworks, and overseeing the 
administration of the FAO (FAO, 2017). The Governing Bodies include the main 
Conference, regional conferences, technical committees, administrative committees 
like the Finance, Legal, and Programme committees, and the Council on World Food 
Security (FAO, 2017). The Departments of the FAO are permanent bodies that carry 
out the specific interest areas of the FAO relating to the work of the Director 
General, Climate and Natural Resources, Regional Offices, permanent programmes, 
and economic and social development work done within the FAO (2020b). Finally, 
the Statutory Bodies exist in between the Governing Bodies and Departments as ad 
hoc programmes designed to address “an identifiable problem of sufficient 
importance in the subject matter field” that is persistent yet can be addressed in a 
limited timeframe (FAO, 2020b). While these subcommittees and administrative 
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bodies are crucial to the work that the FAO does, the CFS is the main focus of this 
paper, as it is the Governing Body specifically focused on food security governance 
and administration. Before any discussion of the CFS can occur, the history of the 
FAO must first be outlined, as it provides policy and historical context within which 
the CFS emerges.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAO 
  
With only a handful of books written on the topic (Hambidge, 1955; 
Marchisio and Di Blase, 1991; Shaw, 2007; Staples, 2006; Tosi, 1989) and an equally 
small number of scholarly articles, the history of the FAO has not been well explored 
academically, at least in comparison to the histories of other international 
organizations like the WHO, World Bank, or IMF (Pernet and Forclaz, 2019). 
Nevertheless, the FAO has a unique place in the makeup of the post-war 
international order. The history of the FAO can be broken down into four main 
timeframes: formation, post-war shortage and surplus, the 1970s scarcity, and the 
present time, characterized by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
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 The FAO, along with several other specialized agencies of the UN, came into 
existence at the tail end of World War II, and was built on the lessons learned from 
the failures of the League of Nations and the rekindled desire for international 
cooperation. The Second World War itself negatively affected food supply and 
production, industrial production of agricultural products, and the overall trade in 
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and of agricultural products and produce (Phillips, 1981: 1-2). These stressors, 
along with the commonplace rationing of food, led to Allied governments engaging 
in cooperative agricultural and nutritional planning in the middle of World War II, 
which Pernet and Forclaz argue gave those governments a taste of what 
international and institutionalized food governance could look like (2019: 346). 
This experience, plus the quasi-international order outlined by the League of 
Nations and some pre-war institutions like the International Commission on 
Agriculture (ICA) and the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA), were the 
foundation on which the FAO was established in 1945 (Phillips, 1981: 7).  
 The founding of the FAO, while formalized in 1945, was a multi-year 
endeavour that started at a conference held between May 18 and June 3, 1943. This 
conference, referred to as The Hot Springs Conference, took place under the 
initiative of President Franklin Roosevelt with the participation of 45 member 
countries, each sending technical experts in nutrition, agricultural sciences, and 
statistics (Hambidge, 1955: 50). The attention given to technical and scientific 
aspects of food, agriculture, and nutrition set the tone for the organization’s focus on 
technocratic governance moving forward (Staples, 2006). Through the Hot Springs 
conference, the FAO was “carefully and painstakingly” organized, ending in a 
compromise between delegates who wanted an action-oriented international 
agricultural regulator, and delegates who preferred a “limited fact-gathering and 
advisory agency” which would be protected and prevented from engaging in 
positive action (Hambidge, 1955: 53). This compromise led to Article 1 of the draft 
constitution, which set the FAO as a primarily advisory organization but one that 
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was open to transformation based on the requirements of future member states 
(Hambidge, 1955, 53).  
 After the Hot Springs Conference, the Interim Commission was immediately 
formed. It was made up of the same members of that made up the Conference, with 
the option of adding additional members by vote. While the Hot Springs Conference 
was assembled to collectively envision what post-war food and agricultural 
governance was to look like, the Interim Commission was organized to tackle the 
administrative and legal details of those visions (Hambidge, 1955: 54). Rather than 
a one-time meeting, the Interim Commission set up headquarters in Washington, 
D.C. with Lester B. Pearson as the chairperson. Its purpose was to formalize the 
constitution and create “a specific plan for the permanent organization in the field of 
food and agriculture.” (Phillips, 1981: 12). The Interim Commission was given three 
main tasks to advance the goal of formalizing the FAO as a truly international 
organization. It was assumed at the time that it was unreasonable to call the first 
session of the FAO since there was no official constitution, and therefore no 
ratification at the national level for member countries. The first task of the Interim 
Commission was therefore to draft the Constitution of the FAO, with the second and 
closely related task to push for the acceptance and ratification of the constitution by 
member countries (Phillips, 1981: 13). The third and final task was to create reports 
on the specific goals and areas of interests that the organization was to focus on, 
which resulted in five technical reports being written on Nutrition and Food 
Management, Agricultural Production, Fisheries, Forestry and Primary Forest 
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Products, and Statistics. Moving forward, the five main subcommittees of the FAO 
were based off of these initial reports (Phillips, 1981: 13; Hambidge, 1955: 55).  
 On October 16, 1945, just over a month after the end of WWII and a week 
before the founding of the UN, the FAO held its first session in Quebec City, chaired 
again by Lester B. Pearson, with Scottish nutritionist Sir John Boyd Orr elected as 
the first Director-General. At the first session, 34 of the 45 nations in attendance 
became full members on the first day, bringing into force the Constitution and 
creating the FAO, the first organization of the UN system (excluding the ILO, which 
Hambidge notes originated with the League of Nations system)(Phillips, 1981: 13; 
Hambidge, 1951: 60). In the closing address to this session, Pearson praised the 
organization’s ability to harness science “to the chariot of construction” and finally 
balance the development of social progress and scientific progress (Hambidge, 
1955: 60). While Pearson’s speech was effective, the next 70 years of food and 
agricultural governance would bring into question the feasibility of bringing balance 
between these two modes of human advancement. 
POST-WAR SCARCITY AND SURPLUS 
 
The first major governance task of the FAO, after filling administrative spots 
within the organization, was to manage the post-war food shortage that persisted 
after WWII had ended through the formation of a Special Meeting on Urgent Food 
Problems (Hambidge, 1955: 62; Phillips, 1981: 60). This group, which was 
formalized as the International Emergency Food Committee, was active between 
1946-1949, and was the primary group focused on international food security. It 
functioned as a centralized body where member states could plan and negotiate the 
57 
 
allocation of food and agricultural inputs while shortages persisted as nations refit 
their industries and economies for peacetime (Philips, 1981: 70). Shaw notes that 
while the FAO was nominally interested in a unified international effort to manage 
food supply, institutional policy was split, as it would be for decades to come, 
between the Global South and the Global North (2007). In the Global North, 
technical efforts were directed toward expanding production through subsidies and 
monopolistic production control, while in the South, the focus was on making access 
to foreign agricultural exchanges and the purchasing of agricultural capital goods a 
requirement of being part of the new international order (Shaw, 2007).  
 Nevertheless, an ambitious attempt to centralize the FAO’s focus on food 
supply and food security was made by then Director-General Sir John Boyd Orr. In 
1946, he proposed an international commodity exchange, called the World Food 
Board, as part of the policy measures being implemented (Hambidge, 1955: 66). Orr 
and his staff argued that this food board would stabilize global commodity prices, 
establish a global emergency foodstuffs reserve, provide funding for surplus 
disposal, and provide a centralized agency that could support third-party 
organizations focused on international agricultural credit, industrialization, and 
economic development (Belshaw, 1947: 298). This exchange would be funded by 
both commercial sale of buffer stock held by the Board, and through a general levy 
on UN members to accommodate the sale of commodities at a subsidized price 
(Belshaw, 1947: 299). Orr and his staff quickly produced a detailed report that was 
published and presented at the Second Session of the FAO, five months after the idea 
was initially pitched, feeding off of the post-war idealism of Western governments 
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(Shaw, 2008: 25). While the general food security objectives of the WFB proposal 
were generally accepted by the FAO, the proposal was amended until it became a 
shell of Orr’s initial vision.  
According to Shaw, two major objectives stood in the way of the WFB 
proposal: the lack of “requisite authority” or legitimacy to co-ordinate such an 
institution, and more importantly, the opposition of the US and the UK to any 
institution which they did not directly control (Shaw, 2008: 27). Instead, the 
objectives were co-opted into more passive governance mechanisms which were to 
be administered by the newly formed Council of the FAO, a centralized executive 
committee of 18 member-states (Shaw, 2008: 29). In this way, the conflict of the Hot 
Springs Conference over whether the FAO should be an active, regulatory body, or a 
passive, governance body was settled in favour of the latter. The governance 
decisions of the first three sessions between 1945 and 1947 set the stage for the 
food security governance of the next twenty years. 
TECHNOCRACY, FOOD CRISIS, AND THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE 1974 
 
Between 1948 and 1974, the FAO continued to refine its global position as a 
technical advisory institution focused on agricultural development. The major policy 
direction of this time came from the FAO’s newly-formed  Expanded Programme of 
Technical Assistance (EPTA), which focused on supplying experts to developing 
countries to provide ad hoc conferences, training seminars, fellowships, and aid in 
the construction of more permanent “training centres” (Phillips, 1981: 71). This, 
along with increased access for developing countries to industrial tools, equipment, 
and experimental seeds, was part of a push to spread agricultural techniques 
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developed in the West immediately following WWII (Phillips, 1981: 72). This effort 
was driven by the FAO’s promise to developing countries that a world without 
famine could be accomplished through a heavy focus on scientific method as a tool 
for world peace. This post-war idealism was quickly dragged down by a rapid shift 
from post-war global peace to Cold War politics, attenuating an already 
underfunded institution (Pernet and Forclaz, 2019: 348). These politics continued 
to negatively affect how the FAO conducted its ambitious goal of a world free from 
want, yet the Organization was still able to complete modest tasks, such as collecting 
and disseminating global agricultural statistics and food safety guidelines leading to 
new domestic policy adoption for member states (Pernet and Forclaz, 2019: 348).  
The next big governance test for food security governance in the FAO came in 
the 1970s with increasing shortages of food around the world. This was brought on 
by four main factors: a decline in global grain reserves, the disappearance of idled 
US farmland, global dependence on imports from North America’s surplus 
production, and the decision by the famine-struck USSR to offset its declining grain 
supply with major agricultural imports rather than restrictions (Shaw, 2008: 120). 
Shaw notes that the problems listed above, which were the viewpoints of the FAO, 
fail to include any socio-economic factors that were present in the early 1970s, 
instead focusing on the technocratic side of the food shortages (2008: 120). 
Nevertheless, by recommendation of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in 1973 
and support by Henry Kissinger, the FAO convened the World Food Conference of 
1974. This was a crucial moment for food security governance, as it was at this 
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conference that the FAO first defined “food security” in order for the concept to be 
useful in policy (FAO, 2003). 
The Conference itself was the site of conflict over the fundamental nature of 
development and globalization and in-fighting over the organizational structure of 
the conference itself. There was immediate recognition by the Conference 
coordinators that the food scarcity of the 1970s was a result of domestic policies 
failing to recognize and take into consideration the interconnectedness of the global 
food system, yet Secretary-General Waldheim, in his opening speech to the 
Conference, blamed the food scarcity on Third World countries for their heavy 
reliance on agricultural imports and lack of domestic production (Shaw, 2008: 129-
130). Nevertheless, the Conference resulted in three major policy recommendations 
which still shape food security governance. The first was the drafting and adoption 
of the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, which, 
in short, formalizes the recognition of the interconnectedness of national 
agricultural and food policies, and argues that this interconnectedness should be 
used to provide food security as a human right and end hunger (OHCHR, 1974). The 
second, related recommendation was the creation of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development in order to boost agricultural production in the 
developing world. This fund was to be made by voluntary contribution, carried out 
by existing institutions, and aimed specifically at increasing food production, 
including livestock and fisheries (UN, 1974). This recommendation was met with a 
lukewarm response from the developed countries, since they argued they already 
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funded development projects, yet no country officially opposed the 
recommendation (UN, 1974).  
The next set of recommendations were split into two categories at the 
conference, with one set relating to global food security, and the other to 
institutional frameworks. With regards to food security, the Conference 
recommended three policy directions. First, the Conference proposed a global 
information and early warning system for food and agriculture, where member 
states would communicate information and forecasts on current crop statistics and 
domestic commodity and input prices. Second, the Conference “agreed to study” the 
possibility of creating a global cereal reserve, although developed countries refused 
this in practise (UN, 1974).  Negotiation and planning of this recommendation were 
pushed to a subcommittee of the top importing and exporting countries. Finally, the 
Conference recommended an increase in food aid, which was agreed to as an 
objective (UN, 1974).  
The last set of recommendations came as part of an attempt by the 
Conference to reshape the institutional framework, specifically taking into 
consideration the importance that this Conference placed on food security. With this 
in mind, the first recommended institutional change was the creation of the World 
Food Council, which was to act as a subcommittee of ECOSOC, assisting national 
governments with “solving the food problem” (UN, 1974). Second, the Conference 
recommended the creation of the Food Security Committee, which would act as a 
new group within the FAO to continuously examine “the situation and the prospects 
of demand, supply and the stocks of basic food products” and whether or not the 
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level of those stocks were adequate (UN, 1974). Finally, the Conference proposed 
the creation of the Committee for Policies and Programmes for Food Aid, which 
would oversee the new food aid objectives and coordinate the fulfillment of those 
objectives (UN, 1974).  
The specific focus on food security at the 1974 Conference framed the FAO’s 
governance over the next twenty years, culminating in the 1996 World Food 
Summit, where food security governance was again the focus, and was reshaped for 
the twenty-first century. The need for the World Food Summit arose out of the 
failure of the goals set out at the 1974 Conference, specifically the Conference’s goal 
of “eradicating hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition within a decade” (FAO, 
1995). Despite these goals, developed countries still controlled the vast majority of 
the global agricultural market, limiting the ability of developing countries to “break 
through” and become producers themselves (Shaw, 2008: 147-148). While technical 
summits existed between the World Food Conference 1974 and the World Food 
Summit 1996, there had not been any opportunity for world leaders to gather to 
assess global food insecurity (FAO, 1995). This, along with increasing malnutrition 
and hunger, overexploitation of fisheries and arable land, and a rapid decrease in 
the agricultural share of development aid prompted world leaders and ministers to 
open the World Food Summit in Rome from November 13-16, 1996 (FAO, 1995).  
 
WORLD FOOD SUMMIT, 1996 
 
The World Food Summit (WFS) of 1996 was viewed by the UN and FAO 
leadership as both a reaffirmation of the “overriding need to ensure food security 
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for all” and a “new beginning” that “will help shape and implement a food security 
strategy” more effective than those of the past (FAO, 1996c). While this Summit and 
the 1974 Conference shared similar missions of understanding and solving food 
insecurity, the major and defining difference was that unlike in 1974, there was no 
global food crisis occurring at the time of the conference. For Shaw and Clay, this 
fact immediately undermined the proceedings and policy prescriptions, as there was 
no shared incentive for anything to actually be accomplished (1998: 72). 
Nevertheless, the Summit set out its goal of reducing the number of undernourished 
people by half by 2015 at the latest (FAO, 1996c). To this end, the Summit members 
agreed to seven non-binding commitments formalized in the Rome Declaration on 
World Food Security. These commitments generally focus on eliminating poverty, 
ensuring political, economic and social stability, and enabling food security through 
international trade and market mechanisms (FAO, 1996a). 
 The commitments of the WFS were at the same time too abstract and too 
lofty for any meaningful domestic policy changes to occur. This combined with the 
non-binding nature of the commitments, the lack of new institutional mechanism 
proposals, and lack of new aid commitments, meant that there was limited change in 
the institution following the WFS. (Shaw, 1998: 73). Post-WFS 1996, the FAO 
becomes more and more decentralized, with emphasis placed on its composite 
parts. This provides a good transition to the CFS, one of the main composite parts of 
the FAO, and the focus of this research. 
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THE COMMITTEE ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY 
 
The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was formed initially to act as 
an evaluative body focused on assessing the economic and material wellbeing of 
agricultural production in order to judge the level of global food security or 
insecurity. A formative report entitled “Matters Pertaining to the Establishment of a 
Committee on Food Security,” outlines four specific characteristics of this new 
organization: keeping a continuous review of the supply, demand and stock of basic 
food, assessment and forecasting of stock levels with special attention paid to 
import and export levels of goods, to review national implementation of food 
security strategies in line with the 1975 World Food Summit recommendations, and 
to recommend short- and long-term policy action (1975a). This broad mandate was 
set up in order that the FAO, through the CFS, could “remedy any difficulty foreseen 
in assuring food security,” although initially the CFS was focused almost exclusively 
on setting policy associated with financial and technical support to aid in 
agricultural production, which was seen as the primary driver behind food security 
(FAO, 1975b). In essence, the CFS was created to address the complex problem of 
hunger through a broad political, economic, and later social mandate and “high-level 
intergovernmental decision-making” (CFS, 2010b).  
 The CFS has operated under these guiding principles for 45 years, yet the 
operation and policy direction of the committee has not been as clear and direct as 
originally intended. Instead, three distinct timeframes emerge, each characterized 
by both internal policy decisions and external food security issues that changed the 
trajectory and functioning of the organization. These timeframes are the food 
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production crises and famines between 1976 and 1993, the World Food Security era 
of 1994 to 2006, and the food price crisis, CFS reform, and multi-stakeholder 
governance efforts of 2007-2019. These timeframes are used in this analysis to 
show the progression of the organization over time and the biopolitical nature of the 
organization’s policies and programmes. This is accomplished by looking at the CFS’ 
session reports. These reports include policy recommendations and assessments of 
global food security, allowing for a comprehensive overview of how the CFS 
understands and approaches food security. Using these two components of the 
session reports, the timeframes are further broken down into an analysis of the 
assessments made in the final reports to provide context for the policies, followed 
by analysis of the policy recommendations over the same time period.  
FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT: 1976-2009 
 
1976-1993: Food Production Crises  
 
  The first session of the CFS directly following the 1974 World Food Summit 
was attended by 74 of 78 member states, with eight other states notifying the 
Secretariat of their pending membership and several international organizations 
including the EEC attending as observers. Notably, the U.S.S.R. and China refused to 
adopt the CFS’ principle statute, the International Undertaking on World Food 
Security, and refused to become members, which in effect denied the CFS the Soviet 
and Chinese agricultural and food stock data, which the Committee required from 
member states (CFS, 1976). This led the Committee to comment that until this data 
was made available, “a comprehensive evaluation of the stock position” of the world 
would not be available. Despite this, they carried out its assessment of the food 
66 
 
security situation based on the “adequacy of world cereal stocks” (CFS, 1976). The 
Committee noted that there were “several important factors affecting the world 
food situation” such as wheat production in the U.S.S.R. and the United States, rice 
production in Asia, and the amount of feed consumed by livestock globally (CFS, 
1976).  
Further, they noted that food stock distribution was inadequate, cereal 
stocks were unsatisfactory in relation to “the objectives of world food security,” and 
that food aid remained significantly below recommended levels (FAO, 1976). The 
effect that lack of food aid had on food security at this time was further compounded 
by a significant lag in the rate of food production growth in most developing 
countries, compared population growth. Finally, the CFS concluded that the lack of 
“an adequate world food security system” put excess pressure on the global market 
as it would not be able to properly handle surplus production (CFS, 1976). The 
Committee argued that overproduction in developed countries would disincentivize 
developing countries to boost production, creating a feedback loop that would put 
developing countries in perpetual underproduction, and therefore food insecurity 
(CFS, 1976).  
 This theme of unequal production continued to characterize the committee’s 
view of global food security over the next five years. In 1977, the CFS found that 
production increased in developed countries, though only due to favourable 
weather rather than specific policies, and production shortfalls continued to affect 
developing countries, leading to continued food security deterioration (CFS, 1977). 
In 1979 and 1981, the CFS echoed almost precisely the same assessment: global 
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production was increasing, but regional production in developing countries was 
drastically declining (CFS, 1979; CFS, 1981). For the CFS at the time, this meant that 
food security continued to be in danger of collapsing. The 1979 assessment begins 
positively with the Committee finding room for optimism over “certain aspects of 
the world food security situation” yet there were still “many reasons for continuing 
and serious concern” (CFS, 1979). They found that cereal production was still below 
the necessary level in many regions and was actually in decline in most African 
countries. Notably, the Committee makes brief mention of the threat that this 
production decline will have on nutrition levels in the region, signalling the 
introduction of a crucial theme for the CFS moving forward. Nevertheless, the CFS 
continued to operate under the assumption at this time that “adequate growth in 
food production for the world as a whole…was the only lasting solution of the food 
security problem” (CFS, 1978).  
 The 1981 session of the CFS saw a change in the way food security was 
evaluated, if only slightly. While the poor food security situation of the late 1970s 
still continued just the same the assessment of the global food security situation 
began with a shift in the attitude towards the concept of food security, as the 
Committee noted that “a review of the adequacy of production and stocks” was one 
of the most important functions of the assessment of food security, and that it was 
part of a balanced assessment, leaving room for other factors to be reviewed (CFS, 
1981). Previously, the assessment only considered relevant information on 
production and stockpiling, and while this was still the primary focus of the 1981 
assessment, other factors were introduced.  
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 The first new variable to be discussed was the cost of inputs. The high price 
of being technologically competitive on the global market was brought up in 
previous years but only as a concern mentioned by delegates and not the Committee 
itself, and always as a secondary thought to the larger issue of production. In 1981, 
the Committee found that the availability of inputs was directly related to the 
success of food security, and that these inputs could also come in the form of harvest 
loss reduction and agricultural research in general (CFS, 1981). They also noted that 
“many delegates” brought up the importance of finding a balance between 
technological advancement, input accessibility, and the importance of protecting the 
production of traditional crops (CFS, 1981).  
 The second new topic discussed at the 1981 meeting was world trade. 
Although mentioned only briefly, the Committee reported that developing countries, 
who were often faced with price decline for their major agricultural exports, were 
unable to “earn the foreign exchange required to meet the extra cost of cereal 
imports and of imported production inputs” (CFS, 1981). Some delegates, the report 
states, brought up the need for fair and equitable access to world markets, and that 
transnational corporations were seen by developing countries to be distorting 
policy and prices since there was no clear governance structure to accommodate 
and regulate their involvement (CFS, 1981).  
 These two new variables continued to be addressed in 1983, when many 
developing countries saw further deterioration in food production and food 
security. The Committee noted that there was a net increase in production output, 
but that the increased production was centralized in developed countries (CFS, 
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1983). The report shows that most African countries were facing rapid 
deterioration of food security as countries dealt with both humanitarian crises and 
drought. This was further problematized by some of the same issues that developing 
countries faced in 1981, namely a sharp drop in export prices, the rising price of 
imports and interest rates, and the adverse effects of export subsidies in developed 
countries (CFS, 1983). Nevertheless, the Committee agreed ultimately that emphasis 
should still be placed primarily on improving production output and productivity in 
developing countries, and that this effort must be accomplished at the national level 
for food security to be obtained (CFS, 1983). This assessment therefore effectively 
ignored the other food security variables it was also measuring, not to mention the 
debt crisis affecting farmers in the US and Europe. In the middle of this assessment, 
the Committee advised that further disaggregation of data should be made available, 
and the scope of foodstuff production assessments should be broadened to include 
non-cereal commodities like pulses. By 1985, this goal was achieved, and new data 
was included in the assessment of that year’s session, just in time to assist in 
detailing the acute food emergency in several African countries (CFS, 1985b).  
 By 1985, the crisis in Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan 
had reached its peak, with multiple other countries across Sub-Saharan Africa 
continuing to underproduce and struggle to meet the food security standards 
outlined by the FAO (CFS, 1985a). Aggregate food aid requirements of the region 
were over double the received amounts and aggregate cereal production was 21 
percent below the five-year average (CFS, 1985a). Even though this food emergency 
was occurring, the Committee notes that global food production had “increased 
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substantially” over the year, leading the Committee to “express concern” that the 
gap between the ample production of developed countries and sharply decreasing 
production of developing countries was widening (CFS, 1985b). According to the 
Committee, this crisis was further complicated by a still-inaccessible international 
credit market. The report notes that although global food prices were low, 
developing countries (now labelled as low-income food-deficit countries) the 
foreign exchange services of these countries were “under great pressure from large 
external debt servicing charges and low prices for many of their exports” blocking 
these countries from even accessing IMF financing services to aid in market access 
(CFS, 1985b). The same financing issues also affected the ability of these low-income 
food-deficit countries from accessing technical and financial resources related to 
agricultural inputs, worsened still by stalled technical assistance programs.  
 Despite all of these issues, which had been building since the CFS was 
founded almost a decade previously, the report’s assessment concludes by 
reiterating that the issue of food insecurity was an issue of production management, 
and that the “achievement of food security” depended “primarily on a sustained 
increase in production at the national level” (CFS, 1985b).  
In 1987, with little to no change in the food crisis occurring in some African 
countries and a continued decline in per capita food consumption, the assessment 
repeated almost all of the observations made two years previously regarding 
unequal global production, trade barriers, the failure of the global development 
financing mechanisms, ultimately concluding with a reiteration of the importance of 
increased production as the main solution to the food insecurity faced by much of 
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the developing world (CFS, 1987). Nonetheless, the 1987 report did make some 
observations that were new, indicating that the Committee was considering new 
data in their assessment of world food security. These new observations include a 
brief statement recognizing the “important role played by women in food security 
and the efforts that need to be made to improve their position as producers of food,” 
and an acknowledgement of regional and sub-regional cooperation as a function of a 
strengthened food security system (CFS, 1987). The assessment was also prefaced 
with a comment regarding the increasing accessibility and use of data on nutrition 
in the Committee’s assessment of food security. These factors of food security would 
continue to be important as the CFS transitioned into the new decade.  
 The assessments made in 1989 and 1992 are unique in the observations 
made because of the rapid shifts in global food production. In 1989, drought 
severely limited North American agricultural production, while some of the African 
countries that had faced food shortages were now faced with surplus agricultural 
production. The Committee still concluded that because of this imbalance, and 
structural issues such as limited access to global trade, financial deficits, and limited 
food aid, the global food security situation was “precarious” (CFS, 1989). A new 
issue arose out of the surplus crop in a number of African countries as noted by the 
Committee, where donor support was required in order to dispose of the “sizeable 
surplus” since limited market access and inadequate storage infrastructure 
constrained those countries from using the surplus (CFS, 1989).  
Despite the bumper crop in some African countries though, the Committee 
“emphasized that in order to achieve food security…it was necessary to accelerate 
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food production in low-income food-deficit countries,” stressing that this was 
required exclusively a national effort, resting on the governments of “developing 
countries themselves” and that the governments of developing countries must 
ensure market access, opportunities for technological advancement and investment 
and the “provision of marketing facilities, inputs, and credit” (CFS, 1989).  
By 1992, the assessment of the global food security situation noted that 
production had again deteriorated to below-consumption levels. Additionally, 
forecasted production was said to be inadequate to meet demand. This was not a 
particularly unique situation, but the difference was in the change in global trade 
liberalization and the opening of major markets. With the Uruguay Round nearing 
completion and the Soviet Union dissolved into its composite parts, the 
international economic and trading environment was fundamentally changing, 
allowing for the trade liberalization and Soviet agricultural data that had been 
sought after for the 16 years of CFS sessions (CFS, 1992). Most notable of all in the 
1992 assessment however is the disappearance of any explicit mention of food 
production as the primary driver behind food security. This particular observation 
had been the stressed every year as the most important part of “solving” the food 
security issue. Instead, in 1992, it became a background implication, replaced by a 
heavy focus on consumption rates, pressure on food prices, food aid and related 
technical and financial assistance, regional supply chain management, and the 
detrimental economic effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (CFS, 
1992). The recognition of the negative effects of SAPs speaks to a shift in larger 
macro-economic trends of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, the global 
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economic order was settling into a new normal: the USSR was disintegrating, and 
Western neoliberalism was firmly established as the new economic order. In the 
context of the global food security system, this shift, as I show below, brought with it 
the use of extensive market data for the identification and regulation of life, which is 
biopolitics.  
1994-2006: The World Food Summit and the New Millennium 
 
The 1994 Assessment first began by addressing traditionally reviewed 
indicators, including crop production levels and stock replenishment, which the 
Committee noted were both facing a downward trend (CFS, 1994). Further, the 
Committee argued that economic inequality, characterized by rising food prices, 
high interest rates, and the deterioration of trade agreements still affected low-
income food-deficit countries despite improvement in GDP growth, creating 
“adverse consequences on food security and for the development of sustainable 
agriculture” (CFS, 1994). Traditionally assessed external variables were addressed 
as well, with the Committee finding that a large number of both manmade and 
natural disasters had affected large areas of Sub-Saharan and southern Africa in the 
previous year. Finally, the Committee noted that food aid was still in decline, despite 
continued efforts to address the issue of maintaining food aid levels (CFS, 1994).  
 By 1996, the year of the World Food Summit, world food security continued 
to falter, characterized by sharp decline in food production in both major importing 
and exporting countries (CFS, 1996a). This of course meant limited availability of 
exports, matched with a forecasted rise in importing, limited stock growth, a sharp 
rise in food prices, and heavier than normal reliance on food aid. According to the 
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Assessment criteria on food emergencies, a total of 31 countries faced a food 
emergency, which was defined as “shortfalls in food supplies requiring exceptional 
assistance,” usually as a result of “crop failures, natural disasters, interruption of 
imports, disruption of distribution, excessive post-harvest losses…or an influx of 
refugees” (CFS, 1996a). Part of this food emergency, the Assessment notes, was the 
high level of landmines still left in primarily developing countries, since these 
landmines were primarily placed under useful agricultural land, limiting production 
potential (CFS, 1996a).  
 The instances of food emergencies continued to grow, and by 1998 there 
were 38 countries facing a food emergency, with a large number of these countries 
facing the negative effects of a large El Niño, causing environmental damage (CFS, 
1998c). Nevertheless, the Committee noted that overall food production was 
forecasted to increase in the following year, creating a food security situation where 
stock levels would remain above utilization and consumption, allowing for 
downward pressure on food prices. Yet despite the growth in global food 
emergencies, and the global surplus of food, food aid amounts were observed to be 
dropping again, to the extent that food aid shipments “were the smallest since the 
start of the food aid programmes in the mid-1950s” (CFS, 1998a). The Committee 
noted that forecasted food aid in the following year could rise.  
 At the 2000 Session, the Committee noted that the above climate-based food 
emergencies had severely disrupted the steady progress the FAO had been making 
on securing food for undernourished people (CFS, 2000a). This realization made it 
clear that without drastic policy measures and national interventions, the goal set at 
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the WFS to reduce the world’s undernourished people by half by 2015 would not be 
attainable. The Committee noted that while these projections of undernourishment 
were important to illustrate the progress of the goals set out by the Committee, they 
“do not provide information on the severity of food insecurity” and that these 
estimates must be complemented by reports on “the depth or severity of 
undernourishment” (CFS, 2000a). To accomplish this, the Committee utilized 
average calorie requirements, ranked from low depth of undernourishment to high 
depth of undernourishment1, and assessed countries based on these new measures. 
The Committee reported that based on these measures, 60 countries faced 
moderate depth of undernourishment and 23 countries faced high depth of 
undernourishment (CFS, 2000a). This inclusion of nutritional data, which made up 
the beginning half of the 2000 Assessment, illustrates the new importance being 
placed on non-supply factors in addressing food security. Moreover, the Committee 
makes brief note of other “health and nutritional status,” measuring percentage of 
children under five years old who were wasted, stunted, or underweight; and life 
expectancy, mortality rate of children under five, and percentage of population with 
access to adequate sanitation (CFS, 2000). These new measures vastly improve the 
depth of analysis and outlined the new direction being taken by the Committee. 
 The increase in indicators measured is elaborated further near the end of the 
2000 Assessment. Building off of World Food Summit goals, the Committee put 
forward a list of eight key indicators to be used for monitoring food security at a 
 
1 Low depth of undernourishment = average dietary energy deficit per person < 200 kcal/day 
   Moderate depth of undernourishment = average dietary energy deficit per person 200 < 300 kcal/day 
   High depth of undernourishment = average dietary energy deficit per person > 300 kcal/day 
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global level: dietary energy supply per person, GNP per caput, percent of income 
spent on food, index of variability of food production, access to safe water, percent 
of population undernourished, under 5 mortality rate, and percent of under 5 
children underweight (CFS, 2000a). These indicators allow specifically for in-depth 
cross-country analysis; an additional 15 indicators were suggested for in-depth 
assessment of vulnerability and food security levels. The Committee argued that 
purpose of the large influx of indicators based primarily on non-food factors of food 
security is to achieve “adequate analysis of food insecurity and vulnerability” (CFS, 
2000a).  
 These new indicators and measures were used in the Assessment of the 2002 
Session of the CFS. Notably, the order of assessed factors of the food situation in 
2002 changed with the introduction of new indicators, with the current status of 
global food and nutrition taking the first agenda spot, followed by “hot spots,” 
followed finally by “other dimensions of food security” which in this case refers to 
supply and stock availability, production data, and import/export market data (CFS, 
2002).  The Committee observed that in both absolute and proportional 
terms, the number of undernourished people went down in a majority of low-
income food-deficit countries (CFS, 2002). Moreover, the Assessment made note 
that child stunting had decreased in all regions except Eastern Africa.  
 In their analysis of “other dimensions of food security,” the Committee found 
that due to a “sharp fall in total grain production,” the ability for major exporters to 
meet global food demands was declining, although it was still within the five-year 
average (CFS, 2002). This also meant that total stocks by the close of the season 
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were down, but some cereal level declines were projected to be offset by good 
harvests, making the overall decline minimal. These two indicators, plus a 
contraction of food production in low-income food-deficit countries leading to rising 
import demand, meant that prices were higher than the two previous years (CFS, 
2002). On top of below-average food production and rising prices, the Committee 
noted that 29 countries remained categorized as facing food emergencies due to 
protracted conflict and natural disasters (CFS, 2002). This was further exacerbated 
by a global economic slow-down that was projected to see recovery in the following 
year. This global slowdown was characterized by rapidly growing inequality and 
increased agricultural subsidies in developed countries (CFS, 2002). 
 This negative outlook led to the Committee commenting in 2004 that there 
had been continuously “insufficient progress so far towards the World Food Summit 
target and Millennium Development Goals relating to poverty and hunger” (CFS, 
2004). This continued increase in the global hungry occurred despite relatively 
positive agricultural production, stock levels, export ending stock, and lowering 
prices. A potential cause of continued food insecurity is the level of instability, 
leading to 35 countries being labelled as in a food emergency, up from the 29 two 
years previous. By 2004, the majority of these emergencies were due to civil strife, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, though environmental and 
economic disasters continued to play a large role (CFS, 2004). For a large number of 
those countries labelled as being in a food emergency, the CFS noted that they were 
“extremely vulnerable to consumption shortfalls” (CFS, 2004).  
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 The number of vulnerable countries facing food emergencies continued to 
climb into 2006, reaching 39. This number may have risen due to a change in 
methodology, since the CFS expanded the scope of what defines a country in need of 
external assistance (CFS, 2006). Regardless, the CFS argued that because of the 
increasing level of countries facing food emergencies, and the increasing complexity 
of the situations that these countries are facing there is a major “need to improve 
emergency response based on credible analysis” by developing an analytical tool 
“for classifying the severity of food insecurity” (CFS, 2006).  
 A major factor in the increasing vulnerability of low-income food-deficit 
countries was certainly the economic and agricultural situation of the world in 
2006, which in retrospect was due to the food price crisis and the general economic 
volatility that led up to the recession two years later. The Assessment reported that 
commodity markets saw increased prices, while agricultural markets, affected by 
“abnormally high incidences of natural disasters,” saw increased pressure on 
demand that was unable to be matched by supply (CFS, 2006). These negative 
trends let the CFS double down on its efforts to measure and regulate life, while also 
making visible the CFS’ inability to do just that. By 2007, these negative trends were 
reversed, though only briefly. 
2007-2009: Food Price Crisis, CFS Reform, and the Multi-Stakeholder Era 
 
In their 2007 Assessment, the Committee no longer took into consideration 
non-food factors as it had been doing since the beginning of the decade, instead 
exclusively relying on stock levels, market indicators, import and export data, all 
under the heading of “Food Cereal Situation Indicators,” and assessments of food 
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emergency situations. They note that almost all indicators show decline in stock and 
production levels, export availability, and a large spike in food prices, including a 31 
percent increase from 2006 to 2007 in the maize index (CFS, 2007). Despite the 
negative trends, the Committee observed that low-income food-deficit countries 
were seeing an increase in production, though not enough to decrease the level of 
aggregate imports to those countries (CFS, 2007). This positive trend in food 
production possibly assisted with the decrease in numbers of countries facing food 
emergencies, which the Committee notes declined from 39 countries in 2006 to 34 
in 2007. The majority of these countries, 26 in total, were in Africa, where countries 
continued to face extreme weather conditions and protracted civil conflict.  
 By 2008, the full effects of skyrocketing food and fuel prices was being 
observed, with the Committee estimating that the number of undernourished 
people had jumped by 75 million over the previous two years, to a total of 923 
million people (CFS, 2008a). In an analysis of long-term trends, the Committee 
noted that since the pre-Summit baseline period of 1990-1992, the global 
undernourished had increased by 6 million, with an absolute increase of 43 million 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (CFS, 2008a). Further, the Committee found that while the 
overall prevalence of hunger, as measured by the MDGs, decreased over the same 
period, this trend was reversed by the food price crisis of 2006-2008 (CFS, 2008a). 
The alone led the Committee to argue that reaching the MDG goal of halving the 
global hungry by 2015 was “becoming an enormous challenge” (CFS, 2009b). The 
causes and effects of the food price crisis have been discussed in depth elsewhere 
(Cohen and Clapp, 2009; Cohen and Garrett, 2010; Watson, 2017) and is beyond the 
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scope of this analysis, though it is important to point out some of the analysis made 
by the Committee regarding its effects. They noted that it at the time of the 
Assessment, it was unclear what effect the food price crisis would have on making a 
distinction between countries already in a food emergency and vulnerable “at risk” 
countries. The Committee argued that while food emergency vulnerability was 
already measured with several key indicators, high food prices themselves added a 
new dimension to vulnerability (CFS, 2008a). 
 The impact of the financial crisis and food crisis came into clearer view by 
2009, when the Committee reported that the number of undernourished people 
rose to 1.02 billion, a large increase from just two years previous (CFS, 2009b). 
Further, they found that people already facing undernourishment and hunger were 
coping with the high cost of food and the financial crisis by reducing food 
consumption and diversity of food consumed. At a regional and national level, low-
income food-deficit countries were coping by reducing spending on education and 
health care (CFS, 2009b).  
Although these food security issues were fairly major, the Committee cut 
short its assessment, relying instead on the assessment produced by the FAO called 
the State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) in order to focus on the extensive 
reform that was being undertaken within the Committee. The brief statement 
summarizing points made in the SOFI are minimally useful for analysis since they 
focus exclusively on the broad mandate of the FAO, and they do not line up with 
policy and governance decision made by the Committee, instead acting as a brief 
primer for whatever policy work is scheduled to be done at CFS sessions. Moving 
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forward, the Committee began entirely relying on these FAO assessments instead of 
conducting their own internal assessments, leaving more room for policy work. Any 
assessments that were made at the CFS were delegated to a new body within the 
Committee called the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), which are committees of 
academics and experts tasked with creating biennial white papers on specific food 
security-related issues, usually focused on policy recommendations.  
CFS POLICY EVOLUTION: 1976-2019 
 
1976-1993: IUWFS, World Food Security Compact, and HFSI 
 
The International Undertaking on World Food Security (IUWFS) arose out of 
the food crises of the early 1970s and was accepted in whole at the World Food 
Conference of 1976 at the same time that the CFS emerged. The agreement marked 
the first time that member states recognized the shared responsibility inherent to 
global food security governance (Shaw, 2007: 150). The CFS was ultimately tasked 
with the implementation of the Undertaking and therefore based early policy 
direction and decisions on the document’s policy recommendations. The IUWFS 
consists of three main elements: the implementation of national food stock policies 
based on associated international guidelines; intergovernmental communication 
and consultation on stock levels and required assistance; and assistance to 
developing countries in order that those countries have access to production 
programmes. These policies were to be organized through an international food 
security information system (FAO, 1975b). While stock management was a major 
focus of the Undertaking, the agreement stressed that the most vital part of the 
policy implementation was “ensuring that food production is adequate to build 
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stocks for food security” (FAO, 1975b). These principles were adopted by the FAO 
and framed CFS policy into the 1980s.  
By the First Session of the CFS in 1976, the Undertaking, which was a 
voluntary, non-binding agreement, was adopted by 69 countries and the EEC, 
accounting for 95 major food exporting countries (CFS, 1976). The Committee noted 
that most principles were beginning to be implemented but recommended several 
policies to member countries to supplement its shortcomings. First, the Committee 
recommended the creation and implementation of “practical programmes” to assist 
with the full realization of the Undertaking. Second, the Committee recommended 
that in order to support the “high priority which developing countries were placing 
on national food production,” international efforts should be made to increase 
financial assistance and ease of market access. Third, the Committee stressed the 
importance of the global food stock information system and urged countries to 
allow access to their stock level and production data (CFS, 1976).  
Of these policy recommendations the first was the most productive, and by 
the Fourth Session of the CFS in 1979, the committee adopted the Plan of Action on 
World Food Security to assist with the enactment of the principles laid out in the 
IUWFS (CFS, 1979). This action plan is broken down into five categories, each with 
subsections outlining specific points. The first measure recommended is the 
adoption of food stock policies, where the Committee encouraged countries to 
formulate their own stock policies. The Plan notes that developed countries have an 
extra responsibility to assist developing countries in creating stock infrastructure, 
providing surplus for developing nations, and stockpiling in way that does not 
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distort international trade to avoid affecting the already limited market access of 
exporting developing countries (CFS, 1979). Second, the Committee recommended 
that stock management systems should be in place such that the stocks are able to 
be released in the case of a food emergency in order to “maintain a regular flow of 
food supplies both in domestic and in international markets at prices fair to 
consumers and remunerative to producers” (CFS, 1979). Third, the Committee 
encouraged donor countries to “do their utmost to increase their food aid” including 
contributing to the International Emergency Food Reserve, creating national food 
aid reserves, and purchasing food from export-dependent developing countries as a 
form of aid (CFS, 1979). The fourth recommendation concerns the formal structure 
of food security assistance, recommending that developing countries should develop 
their own food security programmes, and developed countries should donate 
financial aid to assist in both national and international food security programme 
funding (CFS, 1979). Finally, the Committee recognized the importance of “collective 
self-reliance” by proposing that developing countries set up regional cooperative 
agreements, regional reserves, special trading agreements, and joint investment 
ventures (CFS, 1979).  
Over the next five years, the CFS focused its policy recommendation output 
on the implementation of these directives by monitoring the progress made and 
suggesting further steps. In 1981, the Committee reported that multiple member 
countries had adopted national stock policies, but that these generally did not 
include food stock policies in the interest of global food security, instead focusing 
heavily on domestic stock policy (CFS, 1981). In regard to food aid, financial 
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assistance, and collective self-reliance, the Committee noted that only small steps 
had been taken towards adoption. With this in mind, the Committee made several 
policy recommendations, mostly reiterating the points of the Plan of Action. Of the 
ten recommendations made, six focused in some way on production and production 
assistance (CFS, 1981). 
By the 1983-1984 sessions it became clear to the Committee that the Plan of 
Action had failed to materialize any meaningful policy changes both nationally and 
internationally. The 1983 Session report notes that despite wide acceptance of the 
concept and objectives of food security since the early 1970s, only small steps had 
been taken to ensure that the policies and mechanisms of a global food security 
system was in place. The need for a new, revitalized policy direction, and 
fundamental conceptual framework of food security, was recognized by the 
Director-General of the FAO in 1983, culminating in the formulation of the Director-
General’s Report on Food Security (CFS, 1983). The report, which was not fully 
considered at the 1983 Session, was met with some criticism over its approach to 
food security as a concept with multiple and equal aspects, since the Committee 
considered food production to be the primary factor underlying food security (CFS, 
1983).  
The points of the Director-General’s reports that were considered were 
eventually introduced into the World Food Security Compact, which was requested 
by the CFS in 1984 and adopted a year later in the Tenth Session in 1985. In the 
1983 Report, the Director-General argued for “improved measures for an improved 
world food security system,” which outlined what needed to be accomplished at 
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national, regional, global and institutional levels, ending with a note on the revision 
and strengthening of the CFS (CFS, 1983). These measures would be formalized in 
the World Food Security Compact, which was requested in order to bring revitalize 
public awareness and political and moral support for world security (CFS, 1984).  
The Compact begins with an acknowledgment of the non-uniformity of food 
insecurity as a policy issue, noting that “measures to strengthen food security must 
be carefully tailored to match specific problems they are intended to resolve,” 
marking a change from the CFS’ approach to food security as a problem with only a 
few issues that need solving (CFS, 1985c). Building off of this, the Compact identified 
four main principles that must frame how it would approach food security moving 
forward: that food security is a collective responsibility of humankind; that food 
security relies fundamentally on the abolition of poverty; that food security is a 
necessary objective of any socio-economic planning; and that food must never be 
used a political tool (CFS, 1985c). From these principles, the Compact assigns policy 
guidelines to different groups and stakeholders, specifically for developing and 
developed countries, non-governmental organizations, and individuals.  
The Compact suggests that developing countries should do everything 
possible to promote production of food, including economically incentivizing food 
production, disincentivizing the consumption of imported food, and that this should 
be the top policy priority to ensure food security (CFS, 1985c). The Compact notes 
that economic measures to improve food security should not simply end at 
increasing production, but that financing should be available for stockpiling 
infrastructure and rural economic development, which the Compact notes all assist 
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in the effort to increase production (CFS, 1985c). For developed countries, the 
Compact makes the case for increasing the moral weight of food security in 
economic and agricultural policy, specifically suggesting that developed countries 
should “consider the interests of the world as a whole when making their policy 
decisions” (CFS, 1985c). Further, the Compact suggests that the moral dimension of 
food security should inform trade policy, technical and financial assistance, and food 
aid. Overall, the Compact suggests that “the development of a world food system 
characterized by stability and equity” should be the primary objective for developed 
countries (CFS, 1985c).  
To non-governmental organizations, the Compact suggests an increased level of 
support for governmental action. Specifically, NGOs are requested to help facilitate 
and complement the actions of government by creating a “climate of opinion 
favouring measures for food security,” assisting with information gathering and 
dissemination, and increasing “mutual understanding” by facilitating contact and 
organization between different countries (CFS, 1985c). This is one of the first 
mentions of NGO involvement in the CFS, which, by the 2009 reform, becomes a 
much larger part of the Committee. In this instance, the CFS initiated its reliance on 
NGO data and groundwork as part of its biopolitical project. That is, the frontline 
work done by NGOs in food security and food governance is recognized rightly by 
the CFS as valuable, but that work was and would continue to be exploited for the 
larger biopolitics of the Committee.  
Finally, the Compact addresses the actions of individuals, which previously 
had been the focus of “collective self-reliance” policy recommendations mentioned 
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in the Plan of Action in 1979. The Compact suggests that individuals should focus on 
their food security, but also keep in mind that each human has a “sacred obligation 
to concern himself with food security of those less fortunate,” and that failure to 
acknowledge this connection “is a betrayal of man’s duty to his fellow men” (CFS, 
1985c). Individuals are further tasked with raising the social status of agricultural 
work, conserving the land and natural resources being used for production, and 
actively being interested “in the efforts of governments and organizations to 
promote development and food security” (CFS, 1985c).  
This Compact clearly marks a change in policy direction from a focus on the 
purely economic, supply and demand management of the previous ten years, to a 
moral and social framework. It reaffirmed that food security was more than simply 
an issue of production and identified multiple avenues for and responsibility to 
ensuring food security for developed states and the growing network of NGOs 
working in the field. Yet by 1987, neither the Compact nor its language of moral and 
social responsibility appeared in the Session Report. Instead, policy discussions 
were exclusively focused on the continued need trade liberalization, the failure of 
food aid policies to be timely and sufficient, and the contentious role of trans-
national corporations in the agricultural production of developing countries (CFS, 
1987). Despite recognition of the growing agricultural and food inequality, the CFS 
did not recommend any policies in 1987, nor did it follow up on adoption of the 
World Food Security Compact as it had done in the past with the IUWFS and the 
Plan of Action. 
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Between 1989 and 1993, policy focus and recommendations were 
concentrated on select issues each year, from the effects of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes on food security at the 1989 session, to the role of women and food 
security at the 1990 session. By 1992 and concluding with the 1993 session, the 
Committee once again faced a large policy shift which led to the creation of the 
Household Food Security Index. While this index is primarily a methodological tool, 
it clearly outlines what the Committee at the time considered important for 
understanding the effects and lived experiences of food security. 
 Broadly defined, the Committee recognized that household food security 
required physical and economic access to food, and access to nutritionally adequate 
food, with a focus “longer-term sustainability of access to food” (CFS, 1992). The 
HFSI would be implemented in order to better understand the “causes and 
consequences” of food insecurity in order to better inform policies and programmes 
in the long run (CFS, 1992). This would be accomplished through gathering and 
measuring “relevant indicators” determined by the Committee, which would 
ultimately be incorporated as part of the yearly Assessment and used on a periodic 
basis to assist in the creation of “medium-term policy recommendations” (CFS, 
1992). These indicators are of particular interest here, since they highlight the 
aspects of social, economic and political life considered by the Committee to 
demonstrate food (in)security. 
 The Progress Report submitted to the Committee in 1993 states that the 
main purpose of the HFSI was to create a uniform conceptual framework in order to 
monitor household food trends at an international level (CFS, 1993). This 
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uniformity, the Report argues, comes from the use of multiple indicators which are 
better able to capture the multi-dimensionality of the concept of food security. In 
the finalized index, the Committee settled on three main variables that were both 
broad and accessible: per capita daily dietary energy supply (DES), per capita GNP 
in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) units, and the coefficient of variation in income 
distribution. The first indicator, per capita DES, is an indication of estimated 
“aggregate food availability for human consumption in a country” which is 
converted into caloric units and divided by population (CFS, 1993). The GNP per 
capita in PPP units, a commonly used World Bank metric, was adopted by the 
Committee to establish economic wellbeing, and specifically to establish the “overall 
real purchasing power of an average person” (CFS, 1993). Finally, the coefficient of 
variation of income distribution was used to measure the degree of household 
income equality or inequality. While in general these three data points do not cover 
the broad ranging issues that are associated with food insecurity, they bring 
together social and economic factors that had not be assessed up until the HFSI was 
formalized. The adoption of market-oriented measures shows how the CFS was 
developing a new biopolitics of food security through policies built on technocratic 
and statistical approaches in line with neoliberal understandings of the role of the 
state and international organizations. By the 1994 Session, the Committee had 
begun to use these data in their annual assessments, broadening the scope of the 
Committee’s understanding of food security. 
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1994-2006: WFS Plan of Action, FIVIMS, “Who are the Food Insecure?”, Core 
Indicators, VGRtF 
 
 These non-food factors arose immediately in the policy discussions of the 
1994 CFS Session. In a brief overview entitled “Sustainability and Food Security,” 
the Committee recognized that “economic, social and human factors were at least as 
important, if not more so than, physical and technological factors” in determining 
sustainable food security through agriculture (CFS, 1994). The Committee found 
that food security policy would be enhanced by using these non-food indicators and 
urged the FAO Secretariat to consider this in its report to be delivered in a special 
session of the FAO (CFS, 1994). This policy focus helped, at least in part, to direct the 
policy decision-making that took place at the 1996 World Food Summit, resulting in 
the World Food Summit Plan of Action (WFS PoA).  
 The Plan of Action and Policy Statement presented at the World Food 
Summit represents another major policy stepping stone in the work of the CFS, 
building off of previous plans of action, but also signalling the continued shift in the 
CFS’ thinking on food security as more than something based purely on agricultural 
production statistics. The Policy Statement, a brief call to action preceding the Plan 
of Action, begins by arguing that there is a moral duty to deal with hunger and 
undernourishment through a commitment to “ensuring that future generations have 
secure access to the food they need for an active and healthy life” (CFS, 1996b). This 
would be accomplished, according to the CFS, by ensuring the availability of 
“adequate food supplies” and access to “an adequate diet” for all citizens of every 
country, with a focus on providing these things through sustainable economic 
policy, agricultural production and development policies, and social progress 
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policies (CFS, 1996b). Further, the CFS committed to focusing on the necessity of 
increasing technological and infrastructure investment, particularly as it relates to 
agricultural productivity, “food marketing, processing, quality control, and 
distribution systems” (CFS, 1996b).  
 These broad ranging policy commitments frame the seven specific 
commitments laid out in the Plan of Action. These commitments are non-binding, 
though they are intended to help prepare individual national programmes and 
policy pathways in order to improve food security in each country. Further, they are 
intended to create a level policy field in which countries can integrate and 
collaborate on food security policies (CFS, 1996b). The first commitment suggested 
for adoption is to “create appropriate political, macroeconomic, and trade 
conditions to foster food security” (CFS, 1996b). The Committee recommeneded 
that countries adopt major Western democratic characteristics in governance, such 
as the enforceable rule of law, participatory selection of leaders and legislatures, the 
establishment of property rights and regulations, and decentralizing governance for 
increased efficiency (CFS, 1996b). The corresponding macroeconomic 
recommendations suggested that countries should maintain stable interest rates, 
avoid a financial deficit by balancing expenditures and revenue, and allow free 
market exchange rate adjustments. Additionally, the Committee recommended that 
countries institute economic policies related to food, including maintaining 
“targeted and efficient” food assistance programmes, imposing tariffs on subsidized 




 Building off of Commitment One, Commitment Two recommends that 
countries “ensure that policies and institutions contribute to improving access to 
food” (CFS, 1996b). The Committee suggested that this should be accomplished 
through broad economic growth by increasing market competition, building and 
maintaining infrastructure, encouraging “private sector activities,” and increasing 
land tenure security through policy mechanisms (CFS, 1996b). These policy 
recommendations are balanced out by the recommendation that countries also 
establish a robust social safety net to ensure access to food despite employment 
status, which should include access to nutritional programmes and services, and the 
monitoring and evaluation of food supplies (CFS, 1996b).  
 Tying into the recommendation regarding national social safety nets, 
Commitment Three recommends that countries “meet transitory and emergency 
food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, development, and a capacity to 
satisfy future needs” (CFS, 1996b). The Committee recognized that emergency 
management, especially in the emergency management of food, requires large 
amounts of financial and technical resources, which they suggested was the 
responsibility of national and municipal governments. With this in mind, the 
Committee suggested that countries adopt work for food programmes, 
“decentralized supervision of intervention activities” through grassroots organizing, 
and a focus on human capital development (CFS, 1996b).  
 In Commitment Four, it is suggested that countries aim to develop 
sustainable agricultural practises alongside rural development initiatives in order to 
“ensure adequate and stable food supplies” at all levels of civil society (CFS, 1996b). 
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This Commitment is by far the broadest, encompassing numerous suggestions for 
regulations on agriculture and food production, crop and livestock production, and 
food from forestry and fisheries. In general, the CFS recommended that in order to 
build a sustainable production system at global, national, and local levels, countries 
should assess sustainable use of natural resources, ensure property rights, promote 
diverse economic activity, provide education and skills training, and implementing 
policy on developing non-farm income alternatives (CFS, 1996b). 
 The promotion of sustainable rural and agricultural development requires 
the participation of people, and the CFS stressed this in Commitment Five, where 
they recommend the assurance of “effective and equitable involvement of all people 
in decisions and actions that affect food security, with particular attention to 
achieving the equal participation of women” (CFS, 1996b). The involvement of 
women is the primary focus of this recommendation, and the Committee notes 
several key areas that national and local governments can focus on in addressing 
this issue. Areas where countries are suggested to include women are employment 
and income, productive services, research and information, and decision-making 
and policy formation (CFS, 1996).  
 Commitments Six and Seven are much more specific, with Commitment Six 
addressing the promotion of “investments in sustainable agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries research, extension, infrastructure, and institutions,” thereby adding depth 
to Commitment Five. Commitment Seven is focused on international economic and 
technical partnerships in order to “ensure international cooperation and assistance 
with respect to food and agriculture” in order to address the growing global market 
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linkages connecting national commodity markets to one another in a post-Uruguay 
Round environment (CFS, 1996b).  
 Finally, the CFS set out three main follow-up mechanisms: follow-up and 
monitoring, follow-up and national responsibilities, and follow-up and international 
responsibilities. In the first instance, the CFS suggested that countries and the 
international community must set out actionable and time-constrained processes in 
order to “develop achievable national and global targets and verifiable indicators” 
including the collection of in-depth national data relating to all of the above 
Commitments (CFS, 1996b). In the second mechanism, the CFS argued that all 
government should review any relevant national policies and programmes in order 
to achieve Summit goals, including the implementation of a national review process 
in collaboration with stakeholders and other levels of government (CFS, 1996b). 
Finally, the CFS recommended that international organizations are expected to 
assist in the national and international implementation of the commitments, 
including providing technical assistance, helping to arrange cross-border and 
regional partnerships, and in general, “raising the global profile of food security 
issues and helping to sustain a commitment to universal food security” (CFS, 
1996b).  
 In 1998, it became apparent to the Committee that while some countries, UN 
agencies, and international organizations had reported their steps to implement the 
WFS Plan of Action, it was difficult to draw any conclusions on progress due to lack 
of standardization of indicators. In order to address this, the Committee agreed to 
the formulation of an inter-agency indicator standardization process, the Food 
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Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS). The 
Committee noted that while FIVIMS was meant to “reflect the large differences in 
situations between countries,” there was a parallel need to a minimum 
standardization among national and regional systems, in order that the WFS Plan of 
Action be implemented properly (CFS, 1998c). FIVIMS, like the HFSI before it, relies 
on statistical data to determine causes of vulnerability and food insecurity. The 
indicators offer a look at how the CFS view food insecurity post-WFS. 
 In its “Guidelines for FIVIMS: Background and Principles,” the Committee 
argued that in order to achieve food security success, it is essential to “tackle the 
underlying causes” of food security by combining data from a number of sectors, 
including agriculture, health, education, social welfare, economics, public works, and 
the environment (CFS, 1998b). By combining data from these fields, the Committee 
asserted that the FIVIMS would be able to “facilitate user groups’ access to more 
comprehensive information that is up-to-date and easy to interpret” in order to 
enhance the implementation and success of food security programmes and 
interventions (CFS, 1998b). FIVIMS was intended to use pre-existing national 
systems in order to populate data and coordinate internationally amongst 
policymakers, governments, civil society groups, donors, researchers and training 
institutions (CFS, 1998b). This project, while similar to the HFSI, was much more 
decentralized, relying heavily on the capacity and technical ability of member states 
to set up monitoring systems that would match the requirements of set out by the 
CFS. Moreover, the focus was less on generating statistical data based on a strict set 
of indicators. Instead, the focus of the FIVIMS was to create a food security database 
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for countries to use, and the choice of indicators would be left up to the nation or 
actor using the system (CFS, 2000). There is no mention in the FIVIMS policy 
documents of assistance for developing countries to meet the technological 
infrastructure requirements to utilize the database to the fullest extent, further 
reinforcing the CFS’ technocratic and neoliberal mandate and approach to food 
security governance. 
 Nevertheless, the Committee established multiple indicator guidelines at the 
2000 Session, releasing two major documents in order to do so. The first document, 
titled “Who are the Food Insecure?” established a broad set of guidelines and 
recommendations in order for countries to profile vulnerable groups and determine 
whether or not they are food insecure (CFS, 2000e). The Committee suggested 
creating a “vulnerability group profile” classification system at a national level 
through brainstorming sessions, using data from the FIVIMS (CFS, 2000e). This 
system, the Committee argued, will help countries identify “possible action areas” 
based off of livelihood activities, staple food consumption data, and aggravating 
factors.  
 In the second major policy document of the 2000 Session, the CFS published 
recommended indicators for monitoring food security. This document was meant as 
a supplement to the FIVIMS monitoring programmes being introduced. The 
Committee argued that instead of delineating a rigid set of guidelines, the core 
indicators laid out in the document were for the “purposes of cross-country 
comparison and to provide a manageable dataset for monitoring progress” towards 
the WFS goals (CFS, 2000d). In total, the Committee recommended 103 distinct 
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indicators broken down into 2 main categories (“food security and nutrition 
outcomes” and “outcome indicators for vulnerability factors”) and 15 subcategories, 
or “information domains,” with all 103 indicators cross-referenced with latest 
available UN data source and corresponding UN institution (CFS, 2000d).  
 Between 2000 and 2003, most policy recommendations were focused on 
specific measures for the implementation of specific WFS commitments, with little 
else being focused on. This changed in 2003 with the beginning of another major 
policy change within the CFS, the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive 
Realization of the Right to Adequate Food (VGRtF) (CFS, 2003). In 2004, the 
Committee adopted the VGRtF, which had been created and approved by a CFS 
Working Committee that same year. Just as the title suggests, the main concern of 
the VGRtF is the achievement of the right to food, which differs from the CFS’ usual 
concern of food security in general. Instead of focusing on technical analysis and 
guideline implementation, the VGRtF introduces human rights-based language into 
the policy mechanisms of the CFS (CFS, 2004). Although it frames food security so 
specifically as a human rights problem, the VGRtF represents the culmination of 
policy work accomplished since the WFS It was created to fulfill the CFS’ 
commitment to establish actionable guidelines for the implementation of the WFS’s 
Plan of Action (CFS, 2004). Just like with the Plan of Action, the guidelines in the 
VGRtF are non-binding “practical tools” (CFS, 2004). The CFS makes it clear that 
although the VGRtF is not legally binding, it is meant to supplement the legal 
obligations of states that are party to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (CFS, 2004).   
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 Consisting of 19 guidelines and separate recommendations for international 
commitments and coordination, the VGRtF covers a broad base of policies meant to 
reform government systems and policy decision-making mechanisms to the extent 
that they consider and assist with the realization of an individual’s right to food. In 
the Report, Guidelines 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 17, and 18, concern themselves with the political 
implementation of this right to food, including the promotion of democratic rights 
and good governance, the development of national food strategies and programmes, 
multi-stakeholder governance, the establishment of domestic legal frameworks 
establishing the right to food within legal systems, the creation of national 
monitoring and evaluative mechanisms, and the formation of national human rights 
institutions (CFS, 2004).  
 Guidelines 2, 4, 8, 12, and 14 are interested in the economic implementation 
of the right to food, including establishing progressive and responsive national 
economic development strategies, encouraging the adoption of and participation in 
international market structures and market-oriented policy, the sustainable 
development of natural, genetic, and human resources, creating transparent and 
sustainable financial systems, and implementing social safety nets, focused on food 
assistance (CFS, 2004).  Guidelines 9, 10, 11 focus on health and nutrition, including 
food safety and consumer awareness programmes, the introduction of state-funded 
nutrition and diet programmes, and educational programmes directed at training 
and awareness around food and nutrition. Guideline 13 relates to State’s 
responsibility to vulnerable groups, with the Committee recommending the 
adoption of FIVIMS in order to establish analytical tools to “ensure effective 
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targeting of assistance” (CFS, 2004). Guidelines 15 discusses the issue of 
international food aid, with the Committee recommending that donor states base 
their food aid on “sound needs assessment,” including a clear exit strategy to avoid 
creating dependence Finally, Guideline 16, regarding the issue of natural and 
human-made disasters, the Committee reiterated states’ obligation to international 
humanitarian law, and suggested that states establish and maintain early warning 
systems to “mitigate the effects of natural and human-made disasters” on food 
systems and food security (CFS, 2004). Ultimately, the VGRtF formed the policy 
foundation for the CFS as it navigated the economic crises of the following five 
years, culminating the in CFS Reform of 2009. As I discuss below, the VGRtF has 
impacted the current policy structure of the CFS and led to the policy guidelines of 
the Global Strategic Framework and the work done in the High-Level Panel of 
Experts. 
2007-2019 CFS Reform, the GSF, and the VGFSN 
 
Between 2004 and 2008, the CFS engaged in review processes, analyzing the 
implementation of WFS PoA Commitments. This review was concentrated in the 
2006 Mid-Term Review, but by the 2008 CFS Session’s analysis of the Review it 
became clear that there were serious issues with the commitments of the PoA, 
despite countries already having completed implementation or having taken steps 
to begin the processes (CFS, 2008b). The overall summary of the PoA 
implementation analysis was that while reporting measures were in place and even 
revised for ease of use, relatively few member countries were submitting reports to 
the Committee, leading to difficulties in compiling data and specific information to 
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be used in creating additional policies (CFS, 2008b). Given these difficulties, the 
Committee detailed the future of the CFS in a report entitled “Proposals to 
Strengthen the Committee on World Food Security to Meet New Challenges” (CFS, 
2008c). The Committee agreed that CFS Sessions must be streamlined and more 
policy-oriented in focus, which could be accomplished by concentrating on one key 
food security-related theme per session and having Session reports “focus on action 
items” (CFS, 2008d). Further, the Committee agreed that on a later date the timing 
of Sessions, structure of the CFS, reporting process, and non-state actor 
participation would be addressed and changed (CFS, 2008d).  
 This “later date” came soon after at the 2009 CFS Session, which introduced 
structural reforms to the CFS. Although some of these reforms are purely 
administrative, dealing with by-laws within the constitution of the FAO (the Basic 
Texts of the FAO), some mention is made of recommitment to food security policy. 
In general, the CFS recommitted itself to creating the  
“foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a 
broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated 
manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of 
hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings” (CFS, 
2009a). 
This goal would be accomplished through the implementation of the VGRtF, and 
through the CFS’ commitment to three new roles: global governance coordination, 
policy convergence, and national and regional support (CFS, 2009a). These new 
roles, the Committee noted, would be supplemented by a Phase 2 of role adoption, 
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including national and regional coordination of programmes, promotion of best 
practises and accountability, and the development of a Global Strategic Framework 
(GSF) for food security and nutrition. Among the administrative reforms taking 
place, the CFS agreed to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) in 
order to better inform CFS sessions and include “structured food security and 
nutrition-related expertise” within the policy decision-making mechanisms of the 
organization (CFS, 2009a). The CFS expected the HLPE to take on the assessment 
and analysis work that had previously been done by the Committee itself, and also 
comment on emerging issues based on scientific and knowledge-based analysis 
(CFS, 2009a). The Committee agreed that the HLPE should be composed of experts 
drawn from a database created from CFS stakeholder recommendations (CFS, 
2009a).  
 The Global Strategic Framework developed out of a desire to rethink policy 
coordination in the new reformed environment of the CFS. The Committee noted in 
a concept note on the topic that despite all of the work being done by the CFS, the 
FAO as a whole, and many other development-focused UN agencies, member states, 
and stakeholders, the fight against hunger was lost. The Committee argued that the 
main cause of this failure was the lack of a common policy platform to provide 
stakeholders with “agreed yet flexible, forward thinking, and participatory guidance 
towards coordinated and synchronized actions” (CFS, 2010a). The Global Strategic 
Framework was therefore created to develop a new framework that would 
synchronize policies and help guide stakeholders as they endeavour to improve 
food security systems (CFS, 2010a). The Concept Note states that the process of 
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creating the GSF would be a “comprehensive, participatory, and transparent 
process” in order to ensure that all relevant voices are considered (CFS, 2010a). 
Moreover, the Committee stated that GSF would be supplemental to previous 
CFS/FAO food security frameworks and would be considered a “living document” 
that would be updated periodically by the CFS in order to take into account “more 
relevant, emerging issues” to food security and nutrition (CFS, 2010a).  
 The First Version of the Global Strategic Framework as released and adopted 
by the CFS at its 2012 Session, marking the final turn away from production-based 
food security policy making to results- and knowledge-based policy making. The 
Framework begins with a reiteration of much of the CFS reform points and 
discusses the purpose and goals of the GSF discussed in the Concept Note. The 
Committee stated that in large part, the GSF is an amalgamation of earlier food 
security frameworks, including the VGRtF, and also much broad frameworks, 
international agreements, and regional agreements like the United Nations Updated 
Comprehensive Framework for Action (UNCFA), the G8 L’Aquila Joint Statement on 
Global Food Security, and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAAPD) (CFS, 2012). The Framework is extensive, laying out all 
relevant food security data, knowledge, policy recommendations and programmes, 
including important information to help countries and stakeholders assess who the 
hungry are and what emerging issues they face, to addressing gender issues in food 
security (CFS, 2012).  
 After the initial release, the framework was updated yearly until 2017, with 
each yearly update including a different specific food security policy topic, often in 
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line with the HLPE research results that were published concurrently. Between the 
2014 and 2017 versions of the GSF, the Committee added sections on social 
protection of food security, food security and climate change, biofuels and food 
security, food loss and waste in the context of sustainable food systems, sustainable 
fisheries and aquaculture, water for food security, and livestock and sustainable 
agriculture for food security (CFS, 2017). Another major shift in the content of the 
GSF came in 2015 with the ending of the MDGs and the adoption and beginning 
processes of the SDGs. The shift primarily revolves around the language change 
between the MDGs and SDGs, where the MDG on food security was set on halving 
the number of malnourished, and the SDG on food security and nutrition is focused 
on eradicating hunger and malnutrition. For the GSF, this meant a change in 
programming and priorities, which may explain the disappearance of the GSF by the 
2018 Session.  
 The focus of the 2018 and 2019 sessions were on the future, specifically 
looking to 2030, which the CFS Chairperson noted in his opening remarks to the 
2018 session might be “the most consequential turning point in history” (CFS, 
2018). In this way, the CFS became a primarily proactive organization, in contrast to 
its past 44 years of history which was characterized by reactiveness. Yet in 2018, 
the policy focus was no longer on food security directly. Instead, the CFS was 
focused on managerial tasks, creating policy for its own bureaucratic structures in 
order to manage the new multi-stakeholder identity forged in the CFS Reform nine 
years earlier. The major policy document of the 2018 Session, the CFS Evaluation: 
Plan of Action, is deals with this issue of stakeholder management explicitly, outline 
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how and with what outcomes the CFS would coordinate and strategize the 
involvement of stakeholders moving forward (Mellenthin and Jiani, 2018). 
 In 2019, the Committee went back to adopting and prescribing food security 
policy, this time in the form of a new version of the voluntary guidelines, dealing 
specifically with Food Systems and Nutrition. These guidelines, the latest food 
security policy as of writing, are intended by the Committee “to be a reference point 
that provides evidence-based guidance mainly to governments, specialized 
institutions and other stakeholders” to address malnutrition in all its forms (CFS, 
2019). Specifically, the Voluntary Guidelines on Food Systems and Nutrition 
(VGFSN) are focused on three main areas: food supply chains, food environments, 
and consumer behaviour. In the food supply chains guidelines, the Committee’s 
recommendations are concentrated on four additional policy areas: production 
systems, handling, storage, and distribution, processing and packaging, and retail 
and markets. The Committee argued that these guidelines will help states provide 
available, affordable, accessible, safe and nutritious food through policy 
interventions (CFS, 2019). 
 The second guideline, food environments, is centred on recommendations for 
state policy on the physical space of food security: where food is, food 
infrastructure, affordability, and the marketing, positioning and advertising of food 
(CFS, 2019). This guideline also focuses on food safety and food quality, 
recommending that states introduce measures to improve food quality and food 
safety measures (CFS, 2019). The third and final guideline, consumer behaviour, 
centres on knowledge production, demographics, lifestyle, and food preference of 
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individuals. This guideline is broken down into two sub-guidelines: food and 
nutrition education and information, and social norms, values, and traditions (CFS, 
2019).  
 Currently, these guidelines represent the last major policy work done by the 
CFS and outline the continued push for biopolitical governance by the CFS, 
motivated by the SDG to eradicate hunger. As the analysis below shows, the past 43 
years of CFS activity, assessments, and policy recommendations outlined above 
shows an immense effort to control the biosphere through technical, economic, 









CHAPTER FIVE: BIOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS 
  
 The history of the CFS shows the struggles of an organization to manage an 
issue as broad and complex as food security. But the above exploration of the 
governance and assessment mechanisms of the CFS still leave unanswered the 
question of how the committee’s activities relate to the biopolitics of food security 
governance. Before answering this question, an even more pressing question 
remains: how does food security itself relate to biopolitics? Foucault provides us 
with an answer to this question. In his lecture series Security, Territory, Population, 
Foucault introduces the idea of security in relation to his overall theorization of 
biopolitics by discussing “scarcity,” which is the term he uses to refer to the 
phenomenon of food shortage, or food insecurity. He argues that scarcity is not 
famine, but an acute, “present insufficiency of the amount of grain necessary for a 
nation’s subsistence” (2009: 30). Foucault’s analysis of scarcity is focused on the 
17th and 18th centuries, but the principles remain the same. He argues that food 
scarcity is an issue that affects both the population and the governments, resulting 
in attempts by governments to enact “a system of legality and a system of 
regulation” focused not the halting or eradication of food scarcity, but the absolute 
prevention of the phenomenon, to “ensure that it cannot take place at all” (Foucault, 
2009: 31). These systems put in place to exert absolute control over scarcity 
represent the “regulatory apparatuses” framing a population, which is a function 
inherent to biopower.  
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 In the current context, the FAO, and specifically the CFS, manifests this food 
security biopower as it works to establish regulatory apparatuses and bureaucratic 
control over scarcity. Using the previous chapter’s history of the CFS and the 
methodological tools discussed in chapter 3, this chapter analyzes the particular 
ways that biopower over food security is created in the CFS. To do this I look at two 
major themes that illustrate the biopolitical nature of the Committee’s work and 
regulatory mechanisms. First, I look at biopolitical implications of the CFS’ early 
assessments and production-centered policymaking found in the IUWFS, the 1979 
Plan of Action, and the Compact. Second, I analyze the CFS’ focus on measurements 




The source of the heavy focus placed on production and stockpiling in CFS 
governance is found in the food security definition provided at the 1974 World Food 
Summit, which was the first time that food security was defined by the FAO. This 
preliminary definition states that food security is the “availability at all times of 
adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of 
food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices” (FAO, 2003). 
This definition is the basis of the assessment mechanisms of the early CFS, which 





BIOPOLITICS AND EARLY ASSESSMENTS 1976-1993 
 
The assessments of 1976 to 1993 provide perhaps the most detailed look at 
the underlying logic of the CFS’ objectives and policies before the 2009 Reform, 
although among the assessments made between 1976 and 2009, they are the most 
limited in scope. This limited scope provides strength in analyzing the organization 
as it lays bare the assumptions being made about food security, hungry populations, 
and international governance.  As shown above, the CFS only occasionally moves 
from a purely economic analysis of the global food security situation, and when they 
do it is only brief mentions, as in the case of nutrition and the role of women and 
regional and sub-regional cooperation in the 1987 Assessment. 
  The fixation of the early CFS assessments on economic measurements in 
general, and food production statistics specifically, represents the first step of the 
CFS’ biopolitical governance. Although the Committee transformed and reformed 
itself by continuously refining the foci of assessments, the primacy of food 
production and economic indicators in the assessment acted as both a baseline 
biopolitical framework and as a form of biopolitics governance itself. The focus of 
these early assessments on food production and commodity stocks represents the 
primary site of ideological formation for the Committee, centering the Committee’s 
understanding of food security within a particular economic framework. This 
economic framework positions the CFS’ assessments as biopolitical through the way 
that it shapes the Committee’s governmentality, that is, the relationship between the 
governance structure of the Committee and its membership to be so governed. For 
Foucault, the “natural mechanism of the market” enables governments, and 
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organizations acting in a governmental system like the CFS, to “falsify and verify 
governmental practises,” and in this way determine what is and is not good 
governance (Foucault, 2010). The CFS’ inclusion of market indicators further 
indicates the beginning of a biopolitical governance structure through enacting a 
secondary market mechanism according to Foucault. That is, market systems are 
not only a “site of veridiction” but also determine the “elaboration of the power of 
public authorities and the measures of their interventions” (Foucault, 2010: 32). 
While the Committee discursively placed primary importance on market indicators 
early on in its governance practise and presented itself as a proactive governance 
system, the Committee was fundamentally reactionary to the “truth of the market,” 
where policy and jurisdictional mechanisms were already pre-determined or 
prescribed by the logic of capital. Since these market indicators are not general for 
the CFS, but specifically dealing with agricultural production, stock levels, and food 
aid, the nature of the early assessments are therefore biopolitical, since they are 
reacting to the “contingencies of the living and the phenomena of life” (Mills, 2015: 
98). In other words, the CFS helped produce and then operated through a 
biopolitical framework that normalized global market mechanisms as the arbiter of 
food security. 
PRODUCTION-CENTERED POLICIES: THE IUWFS, 1979 PLAN OF ACTION 
AND WORLD FOOD SECURITY COMPACT 
 
 The policies derived from the early assessments reinforce the above analysis, 
especially in the case of the IUWFS and the 1979 Plan of Action. Both of these policy 
documents are focused on improving the same economic indicators used in the food 
110 
 
security assessments, creating guidelines for countries to aspire to, and 
recommendations on best practises, thereby acting out the narrowly defined and 
market-oriented biopolitical governance discussed above. Yet the Plan of Action 
appears on the surface to go beyond these economic indicators as calls for the 
differentiation of roles between the developed and developing world, a handful of 
variations in the procurement and distribution methods of food aid, and the 
recommendation of food emergency stock management systems. Looking beyond 
the surface level connection, it is evident that these variants in policy all stem from 
the same biopolitical strategy as the indicators and policy objectives covered in the 
IUWFS and the assessments above. The biopolitical connection between these two 
policy documents is further shown in the noted failure of their approaches to food 
security in the 1983 Session. 
 These failures contributed to the paradigm shift seen in the 1983 and 1984 
CFS Sessions, and ultimately the World Food Security Compact. While the 
recommendations of the Compact go beyond the production-centred approach of 
the IUWFS and the Plan of Action, they directly build on the central biopolitical 
framework of those policy documents. That is, the basis of the Compact still views 
economic regulation, particularly through productivity increases and management 
of commodity grain stocks, as the primary source of food security. This is shown not 
only in the recommendation that developing countries increase production, but also 
in the promotion of financialization of agricultural systems and infrastructure.  
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 The Committee goes beyond this basic level of economic biopower in the 
Compact in two notable ways. First, they recommend the adoption of a moral 
interest in the wellbeing and interests of “the world as a whole,” and that this moral 
element should inform policy decisions made towards developing nations, including 
financing and food aid decisions. Second, the Committee recommends “collective 
self-reliance,” suggesting an attitudinal and behavioural change focused on 
individual duty to alleviate food insecurity.  
Both of these recommendations explicitly bring the “population” into focus, 
which for Foucault is the biopolitical subject. Moreover, the positioning of 
developed countries as active, moral participants, opposed to the passive, 
unproductive developing countries reinforces the biopolitical strategy of the CFS 
through the intensification of political and economic control over life via 
management of global food flows. Further, the phrase “collective self-reliance” 
masks the true intention of the CFS’ recommendation, which in the language of 
biopolitics is simply the individualization of the population, that is, the attachment 
of quasi-individualized phenomena to the population. This quasi-individualization 
appears in the CFS’ collective self-reliance recommendation when they note 
individuals should do what they can to focus on their own food security but that 
they also have a “sacred duty” to the broader population, especially those less 
fortunate (CFS, 1985). The recognition of the biopolitical population, which for 
Foucault is the “end and instrument of government,” is continued in the inclusion of 





ASSESSMENTS AND STATISTICS  
 
 Statistics plays a major part in the assessments of the CFS. The Committee’s 
assessments used basic macro-economic data, such as commodity trade prices and 
production levels, and also population statistics to determine the state of food 
security, continually presenting the vital importance these statistics play in 
conducting assessments and determining policies and strategies. The assessments 
use these statistics to strengthen the biopolitical framework being discursively built 
by the CFS. While these statistics do not go so far to necessarily quantify the “basic 
biological features” of life, the CFS uses these statistics to objectify the population as 
the biopolitical “datum that depends on a series of variables” (Foucault, 2009). 
Instead, the quantification of life as a biopolitical means of power is left for 
operational policies about the collection, usage, and analysis of statistics and 
information that emerged as the CFS evolved.  
BIOPOLITICS AND THE QUANTIFICATION OF FOOD SECURITY 
 
 The introduction of the HFSI in 1993 was a major turning point in the CFS’ 
analytical policy. Although the HFSI is purposefully limited in scope, confined to only 
household trends, its creation builds on the biopolitical framework of the early 
assessments and policies through the inclusion of social indicators. The introduction 
of three new indicators into the evaluative toolbox of the Committee helped spur the 
Committee’s transition in the 1996 World Food Summit to a more inclusive socio-
economic focus for food security policy. The micro-economic focus of the two of the 
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three indicators (per capita GNP in PPP units, and the coefficient of variation of 
income distribution) adds a social aspect to the macro-economic indicators of the 
past assessments. The third new indicator, measuring the “aggregate food 
availability for human consumption in a country,” is the first time the CFS used a 
statistical measure of food availability per capita (CFS, 1993). Moreover, it marks 
the beginning of the CFS tracking food availability and intake, directly using 
biological data to measure food security. The use of these statistics therefore 
continues to build on the biopolitical process of specific individualized phenomena 
attached to a population. Further, it fulfills Foucault’s definition of the population 
being a set of constitutive elements extending from “biological rootedness” up to the 
public surface (Foucault, 2009). That is, with the inclusion of micro-level analysis 
based on socio-economic and biological data, the Committee is able to assess both 
micro- and the macro-level population data of production discussed above.  
 This trend was continued post-World Food Summit with the introduction of 
two new policies, the FIVIMS and the “Who Are the Food Insecure?” guidelines. 
FIVIMS represents an intensification of the statistical processes within the CFS by 
increasing the scope of data captured to include numerous sectors. With FIVIMS, the 
CFS makes explicit the role of population in their decision-making and analysis by 
breaking down data into categories for use by specific “user groups” (CFS, 1998). 
The FIVIMS further acts as the first specific instance where the CFS becomes an 
aggregator of biopolitical power, as it uses data and policies from its membership to 
populate the data collected. The nature of FIVIMS as an open access data repository 
allows for the use of biostatistics and socio-economic data for biopolitical ends by 
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both states and international institutions since it allows for ease of access with no 
guidelines on usage.  
 The FIVIMS was quickly followed with the supplemental document “Who Are 
the Food Insecure,” which built on the construction of population groups by 
providing guidelines on determining who should be considered “vulnerable groups” 
(CFS, 2000). Further supplementing the FIVIMS was the recommended indicators 
for policy production and monitoring of food security document. This document, 
along with the “Who Are the Food Insecure” document, are the full realization of 
biopolitical governance in the CFS. The regulatory power of the FIVIMS, refined 
through these two documents, is an attempt to capture life through data analysis 
and policy production, and to regulate populations as both an “end and instrument 
of government” (Foucault, 2009). Fundamentally, the FIVIMS was created in order 
to track the “errancy internal to life” and set a path to regulating that errancy (Mills, 
2015). To illustrate this, dozens of policies were created for and adopted by the 
FIVIMS system after its introduction in 2000. In 2001, a number of organizations 
and FAO subcommittees contributed “normative work” for FIVIMS by collectively 
introducing poverty targeting strategies based on GIS software and methodology 
developed by the World Bank. (FAO, 2001). By 2004, the CFS, along with other 
stakeholder organizations, had established multiple national, regional, and sub-
regional profiles of food security vulnerability by compiling and analyze geographic, 
economic, and physiological statistics into several databases, including the Nutrition 
Country Profiles, the Poverty Mapping Project, and the Vulnerability Analysis and 
Mapping, which was to be consolidated into the Standard Analytical Framework for 
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Food Security Monitoring and Vulnerability Analysis. This system was extensive, 
and no doubt contributed to unfocused policies and decision making of the post-
reform CFS currently in place today. Further, despite the depth of analysis and 
breadth of statistics being tracked, malnutrition and food insecurity continued to 
worsen, culminating in the failure of the MDGs in 2015 and the holding pattern 
policies of the 2018 and 2019 CFS sessions. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This system was continually built upon until the reform period of the CFS 
post-2009. After this time, the governance structure shifted to focus on internal 
management, administering guidelines, and facilitating more qualitative and 
normative analysis through the HLPE in support of the biopolitical project of the 
CFS. Currently, the CFS appears to have split its focus. On the one hand, the 
biopolitical governance and regulation of food security continued in 2019 with the 
introduction of the VGFSN which promotes a wide range of recommendations 
focused not only on food security and also business regulations. On the other hand, 
the CFS has transformed into an organization that is heavily focused on its internal 
affairs and the administration of its own bureaucracy. This can be seen primarily in 
the amount of time spent on updating the GSF between 2010 and 2019, the lack of 
assessments conducted by the CFS, and the 2018 Session being solely focused on 
administrative tasks. The inherent difficulty in regulating global food security, which 
the CFS came up against constantly as it questioned why malnutrition continued to 
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get worse, has left the CFS unfocused and heavily bureaucratic for the sake of 







CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
The story of the CFS and the FAO shows the ideas of global governance and 
international institutions from Chapter Two put into action. The CFS in particular 
represents Roberts’ reading of global governance as a “functional and necessary” 
managerial phenomenon which addresses the unevenness of globalization (2010: 
46). The global governance of the CFS functions as a hegemonic system as it 
incorporates the ideas and worldview of the larger neoliberal project which occurs 
parallel to the evolution of the CFS. Yet the CFS uses the particular methods of 
subjectivity and structures of power inherent to the global neoliberal order for the 
very specific purpose of attempting to manage and regulate agriculture, food 
systems, and the health and nutrition of populations. The discursive aspects of the 
CFS, analyzed in Chapter Four, reveal the ideational processes and norm creation as 
being the central point of power within the Committee, creating Haas’ “epistemic 
communities” through shared knowledge and policy coordination (1992: 3). These 
processes resulted in the creation and use of production-based assessments and 
policies, and also extensive statistical methods and programs, through which the 
CFS has constituted and continues to implement a system of biopolitical governance 
focused on food security.  This account of the CFS and biopolitics provides some 
insight into the functioning of food security as a policy object. This allows us to 
reflect on food security’s place in the broader body of knowledge, discussing the 
limitations present in this research, and provide possible avenues of future 
research.  In this thesis, I have provided a deeper understanding of food security 
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governance at the international level through the application of Foucault’s theory of 
biopolitics.  
CONTRIBUTION TO BROADER LITERATURE 
 
This research adds to the body of literature in two particular ways. First, it adds 
to the specific discussion of food security as a biopolitical object. As addressed 
above, Foucault saw food scarcity as a particularly pertinent example for illustrating 
the evolution of states’ regulatory mechanisms. Nevertheless, the work being done 
on biopolitics is muddied by the fact that Foucault either purposefully left the 
concept loosely defined or died before being able to fully elucidate the idea further. 
This research provides a biopolitical and discursive analysis of food security 
governance and contributes to the understanding of biopolitics by using the CFS as 
an example of biopolitics in practise.  
Second, this research adds to the body of literature focused on the work of the 
FAO in general and the CFS in particular. The CFS is lacking in research from a 
historical perspective, allowing for this research to fill a glaring gap in examinations 
of the international institutions that regulate food security as policy and practice. 
The discursive institutional perspective, itself an offshoot of the larger historical 
institutionalism within political science, provides this research with a unique 
perspective through the analysis of how biopower is constituted discursively within 
the Committee. Further, this research can be extrapolated to the longer history of 
the FAO, since the Committee functions as part of the FAO. The history of the FAO up 
until this point, as I show in the introduction in Chapter Five, is confined to only a 
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handful of works. This analysis of the CFS can shed some light on the way that the 
FAO his historically understood food security. While this research does contribute to 
the wider body of literature, there were limitations to the research conducted.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are three main limitations to this research. First, and most crucially, 
relates to the primary data sources available. The primary data, that is, the reports 
and assessments of the CFS, were intentionally limited to provide a clearly 
delineated area of study, but two seemingly contradictory issues arose while 
conducting the primary data research. First, the CFS has a publicly available online 
archive of all documents relating to its annual sessions, going back to 1974. This 
provides ample sources of data for analysis and also reveals a restriction in this 
research. The time constraints on this research and the analytical constraints of the 
project made it unrealistic to cover in detail each document in each annual session, 
but these documents more than likely contain useful information.  
Second, and related, although the available content on the CFS and the FAO is 
more or less available online, there remains a restriction of access to some data and 
more first-hand knowledge of the internal operations of the CFS. Since the FAO and 
the CFS are located in Rome, access to their archival data was non-existent. This 
information would have provided a deeper look at how the FAO and the CFS 
construct themselves discursively. 
Third, I came up against a limitation in the formulation of my research goals 
and objectives. That is, one of the objectives I initially wanted to research was how 
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the CFS produced its information. While I discussed some of the ways that the CFS 
created knowledge, including the methodologies and statistics, I was limited in what 
I could focus on without being too broad. In particular, the current post-reform CFS 
includes the vitally important HLPE, which currently is the centre of knowledge 
production informing CFS policy. Their reports are highly detailed and cover a large 
scope of food security and related issues.  
 Given the broad scope of literature available within the CFS, and the room for 
application of biopolitics within food security governance analysis, there are three 
main pathways for future research based off this research. First, building off of the 
last limitation above, more research should be done into the production of 
knowledge within the FAO and CFS. This type of analysis could be centered around 
biopolitics, but in general should take into account the hegemonic reading of global 
governance and norm diffusion. Understanding the power structures within the CFS 
and how they relate to knowledge production would add depth to our understand of 
how the organization functions. This research would entail taking a deeper look at 
methodologies for early assessments, the HFSI, and especially focus on the FIVIMS, 
which includes multi-stakeholder relations; a broad indicator base; multiple 
national, regional, and sub-regional profiles; and the introduction of accessible 
information technology for the time period, like CD-ROMS. 
 Second, again building off of the limitations above, future research in this 
area should look at a larger historical analysis of the CFS. The archival information 
available online on CFS sessions is immense and could provide a highly detailed 
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history of the organization. The CFS is a highly interesting organization because of 
its limited scope but broad regulatory power. This type of historical institutional 
analysis would add to political history in general and provide insight into food 
security governance specifically. This research would add to works like those by 
Shaw (2007) and give more detail to the story of food security in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. 
 Finally, future research should focus on and continue to build on the idea of 
food security as biopolitics. The complexity of food security and related issues like 
food sovereignty provide fertile ground for biopolitical analysis. Framing food 
security policy research through biopolitics helps address some of factors often 
missed by an analysis of just power structures and imbalances. The inclusion of the 
recognition of the power over life and biological processes adds another layer to 
research interested in politics and food. This research is crucial for understanding 
how we can better address food security and ultimately address the uneven way 
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